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I. INTRODUCTION 
In recent decades, there have been developments in economic theory and empirical 
study of endogenizing public policies. Governments intervene in developed or 
developing countries or centrally planned economic countries in economic systems; to 
achieve governmental goals, to influence the private sector's behavior, or to manage 
domestic system and international trade directly. (Rausser and Stonehous, 1978). Much 
of the governmental behavior is often treated as a passive, exogenous, force in 
macroeconomic models. When we consider macroeconomic fluctuation, however, it is 
obvious that macroeconomic fluctuation today is so intimately connected with 
government polices that realistic explanations and forecasts of macroeconomic 
fluctuations require that government behavior be analyzed as an integral part of the 
fluctuations. This means that it is useful to treat the government as an endogenous 
rather than as an exogenous actor in the macroeconomic system (Lindbeck, 1976, p. 
11). 
We know that all economic decisions, virtually, other than the trivial, involve 
time (Shaw, 1984, p. 9). So we often need some expectations about economic variables 
to make decisions. Perhaps economic forecasts, either for short-run or long-run must 
be conditional upon governmental policy variables. Differences between various short-
run economic forecasts often depend less on internal functioning of the private sector 
than on different assumptions of future polices (Rausser, Lichtenberg, and Lattimore, 
1982, p. 548). Therefore, there exists, possibly, a simultaneous interaction between 
governmental setting of policy variables and the response of private sector behavioral 
units. Given the feedback relationships among governmental policy-makers and the 
private sector, in the long-run, especially for forecasting purpose, it would seem 
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essential to endogenize both private and public sector behavior related to a particular 
system. 
The formulation of government policy consists of a series of subprocess: the 
subprocess of setting policy and subprocess of implementation. The process of setting 
policy can be defined as the specification of an area of government intervention, the 
determination of general goals and specific targets for that intervention, and the 
choice of instruments to be considered permissible for use in achieving the stated 
goals. A policy is a set of goals and instruments drawn from the larger set of goals 
and instruments available to the government. The process of implementation can be 
defined as the choice of policy instrument levels given the policy set. 
The theory of quantitative economic policy (QEP) was pioneered by Tinbergen 
(1961) and others and extended by Theil (1961) and others; see, for example, Fox, 
Sengupta, and Thorbecke (1966). This theory grew out of the need encountered during 
the great depression of the 1930s and during the post-World War II reconstruction and 
demobilization to provide national governments an operational method that they could 
use to stabilize their economies. It has been extended to other areas like economic 
development. 
This QEP theory reached its maturity before the Muthian rational expectations 
hypothesis (REH) had a significant effect on the economic profession. The QEP 
rationalizes the public policy process. It assumes all people, those in the private 
sector and in the public sector, are rational, informed, and goal directed. However 
QEP fails to account for effects of economic agent's expectations of public policy 
choices upon their behavior. 
The REH assumes that the public sector is rational, informed, and goal oriented, 
and that individuals in the private sector are goal oriented in their behavior. 
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myopically (or tunnel visioned) rational, and informed. These individuals have a good 
deal of information about the operations of the private sector. Muth (1961, p. 316) 
wrote "expectations, they are informed predictions of future events, are essentially the 
same as the predictions of the relevant economic theory." Economic theory does not 
explain or predict future political events or public policy choices. It leaves that 
job to political scientists. From its very beginning, most work on the REH has ignored 
the work on the QEP and treated the operation of the public sector as exogenous or 
stochastic. 
In the REH, the public sector makes policy choices that have predictable effects 
(through economic theory) upon the private sector. But most REH work does not try 
to explain these choices. The QEP, on the other hand, does treat public choices as 
endogenous; it considers effects of private decisions upon public choices. 
Both QEP and REH are of value, but each is incomplete and it is worthwhile to 
synthesize the two. Taylor (1979) tried to synthesize the QEP and the REH and 
derived optimal monetary policy rule. This study discusses some possible assumptions 
underlying both the QEP and the REH and presents some possible syntheses that differ 
from Taylor's in the context of political economy. This study casts doubt on the 
validity of the claims to conceptual superiority of the REH, and questions some of the 
conclusions of the REH. This study also demonstrates the existence of possible 
internal contradiction in the assumptions of the QEP models. 
Crotty (1973) pointed out that econometric estimation procedures of 
macroeconomic models with assumption that the policy variables are exogenous rather 
than endogenous may be subject to important specification error. To show the 
specification er'or and how the policy variables are endogenously determined, he 
assumed that the government has a preference function which orders possible outcomes 
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related to a set of economic instruments and goal variables. Crotty used "the Theil's 
framework to demonstrate explicitly the serious nature of the specification error that 
may arise if the preference function underlying government policy is ignored in 
macroeconometric work" (p. 1025). 
When we have an interest in analysis of government policy rules, the synthesis of 
the QEP and the REH allow us to derive differences between econometric regressions 
with government preference function and without, a difference that was ignored in 
Taylor's synthesis. This study will call these differences specification errors as 
Crotty did. The synthesis of the QEP and the REH also allow us to investigate Lucas' 
(1976) well known critique of econometric policy evaluation under the assumption of 
endogenizing government policy variables. 
For purpose of this study, chapter II through IV survey literature. Chapter II 
will survey both macro and microeconomic literature which stress endogenous 
government behavior. Chapter III will review Theil's QEP framework which gives us 
the mathematical background to analyze optimal decision rules under constraints. 
Chapter IV will briefly review concept of rational expectations and its applications to 
macro and microeconomics, summarize rational expectations model, and present some 
possible assumption about predictions of exogenous variables and of policy variables. 
Chapter V will present some assumptions underlying the QEP and the REH, discuss 
some possible syntheses of the QEP and the REH, derive specification errors, test the 
validity of the claims to conceptual superiority, investigate Lucas' critique, and show 
internal contradictions of QEP models. Chapter VI will present an empirical study 
using Taylor's simple U.S. macroeconomic model and then make numerical comparisons 
of the possible syntheses and test theoretical specification errors that arise when 
endogenized policy variables are treated as exogenous variables. From the numerical 
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comparison of the syntheses, it is expected that we could find optimal policy rules 
according to the underlying assumptions. Chapter VII will derive conclusions of this 
study. 
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II. ENDOGENIZING POLICY VARIABLES 
A. Political Macroeconomics 
1. Theories 
Today's political choices affect our economic life as a consumer and/or producer. 
Much of the literature tries to develop the political-economic relationship and find 
the political role in the formation of government macroeconomic policy. One macro 
political-economic model is presented in Figure 1, where there exists an interdependent 
relationship between government and private sectors. The government sets the 
economic policy and this policy is implemented by the state bureaucracy. Capitalists, 
that is private firms and consumers, take part in the economy through capitalist 
market system. The economic performance affects the private sector's economic life 
and the electorate's votes.' In this framework some noneconomic factors like 
ideology^ of the party and non-economic welfare and public provisions have an 
important role. Much of the literature of political-economy focused largely on the 
attempts to make government policy actions endogenous and to identify politically 
motivated business cycle (Hibbs, 1981). 
'There are some empirical studies on peoples' voting behavior. Fiorina (1981) 
found that economic conditions and evaluation appear to have both short- and long-
term affects on the vote. Personally experienced and/or- perceived economic effects 
have indirect effects on the vote, that is effects channeled through evaluation of 
government executive performance, through the formation of future expectations, and 
through modification in party identification. For more detail, see also Kinder and 
Mebane (1983) and Borooah and van der Ploeg (1983, chapter 3). 
^Ideology means political party positions or lines in this study. Ideology is a 
important element in determining votes for a specific political party. This topic is 
beyond our subject. For more detail about ideology see Navarro (1984, Part 3). 
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ideology ideology 
political popularity power 
GOVERNMENT OPPOSITION 
votes 
economic" - . 
welfare 
demand 
STATE 
BUREAUCRACY 
ECONOMY ELECTORATE CAPITALISTS 
public provisions 
(defence, etc.) 
business interests and 'old boy network' 
Figure 1. Political economic structure (Borooah, Vani K. and Frederick van der 
Ploeg, 1983) 
A number of literature deals with the political aspects of policy formation and 
examines the interplay of political and economic forces that combine to generate what 
is termed the political business cycle. The assumption underlying the presumed 
existence of such a cycle is that government authorities, by adopting proper policies, 
are able to influence economic outcomes. Given that these economic outcomes will, in 
turn, affect its political popularity, government authorities interested in re-election 
may attempt to manipulate the economy so that periods of economic strength occur 
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prior to elections and periods of economic weakness are confined to years when 
electoral popularity is not so vital (Borooah and van der Ploeg, 1983). These 
politically motivated policies would then generate that cycle of booms and slumps 
termed the "Political Business Cycle." 
The orthodox theory of economic policy views the government as a benevolent 
dictator who implements economic policies, such as unemployment, inflation, income 
growth, balance of payment, etc., in an attempt to promote social welfare. It is 
concerned with how the government should behave to improve social welfare, so it has 
a normative character. The orthodox theory, however, ignores the fact that a 
government has objectives of its own manifested in its ideology and its attempts to 
secure re-election which may well differ from the social welfare objective. Positive 
theories that describe how the government actually behaves are needed and provided by 
political economics (e.g., Kalecki, 1973; Nordhaus, 1975; Lindbeck, 1976; Frey, 1978, 
1983; Tuf te, 1978; Hibbs and Fassbender, 1981; Monroe and Levi, 1983). 
2. Empirical studies 
Most empirical studies of the political macroeconomics focus on the potential for 
a politically motivated business cycle.^ Nordhaus (1975) used U.S. data for period 
1947-1972 to test the hypothesis that during an electoral period the unemployment rate 
should rise during the first half of the period and fall during the remaining half. The 
result of his test indicates strong conformity with the theory for the elections of 1948, 
1952, and 1956 with unemployment falling sharply before elections and rising after 
elections. Unemployment was falling before the 1964 election, rising sharply after the 
^The basic assumption of the political business cycle framework is that there 
exist a short-term trade-off relationship between inflation rate and unemployment rate, 
that is, the Phillips Curve. 
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1968 election, and falling before the 1972 election. It is interesting to note that two 
elections for which the pre-election pattern do not fit the theory, 1960 (Eisenhower) 
and 1968 (Johnson), are years in which the incumbent party lost the election. The 
economic program during the first Nixon administration was a textbook example of 
planning for the political business cycle. The Nixon's "game plan" resulted in a 
recession during the early part of the administration and unemployment rose from 3.4 
percent in late 1968 to 6.0 percent in late 1970.^ The announced plan of the 
administration (in the 1971 Economic Report of the President) was then to return to 
4.5 percent unemployment by late 1972, that is by the 1972 election. Nordhaus' general 
conclusion was that a perfect democracy with retrospective evaluation of parties would 
make decisions biased against future generations. Moreover, within an incumbent's 
term in office, there is a predictable pattern of policy, starting with relative austerity 
in early years and ending with the gifts right before elections.^ 
Tufte (1978) tested for an electoral-economic cycle in twenty-seven western 
democratic countries and found evidence of its existence in 19 of 27 countries; in those 
19, short-term accelerations in real disposable income per capita were more likely to 
occur in election years than in years without elections. Combining all the experiences 
of the 27 countries over the period of 1961-1972 reveals that real disposable income 
growth accelerated in 64 percent of all election years compared to 49 percent of all 
the years without elections. Furthermore, for those 19 countries whose economies ran 
'^Most economist felt that this drastic recession would make substantial inroads on 
the rate of inflation. 
^Nordhaus also tested that the hypothesis for other countries. His overall 
results indicated that for the entire period a political cycle seems to be implausible 
as a description for Australia, Canada, Japan, and the UK. Some modest indications of 
a political cycle appear for France and Sweden. For three countries—Germany, New 
Zealand, and the United States, the coincidence of business and political cycle is 
very marked (Nordhaus, 1975, p. 186). 
faster than usual in election years, the effect was substantial: real disposable income 
growth accelerated in 77 percent of election years compared with 46 percent of years 
without elections. His fundamental point of the aggregate evidence is that 70 percent 
of the countries showed some signs of a political business cycle. 
Tufte also explained the relationship between the electoral cycle and economic 
policy. He found some examples of expansionary fiscal policies during booms 
immediately before general elections. Examples are Germany in 1965 and the UK in 
1955 and 1965: the conclusion is somewhat weakened by the fact that some counter 
examples, of restrictive actions immediately before general elections, can be found, 
such as the increase in direct taxes in Sweden in 1960 and in the UK in 1965, as well 
as the introduction of the surcharge in the U.S. in 1968. In the U.S. historically 
the supply of money has increased more rapidly in the two years before presidential 
elections than in the two years following. For example, changes in the biennial growth 
rate in money stock (Ml, currency plus demand deposits) have shown a strong 
relationship with presidential elections, especially when Eisenhower years are excluded. 
Out of five presidential terms, except during the Eisenhower years, for the period of 
1948-1976, there have been four occasions in which rate growth of money supply has 
increased two years prior to the presidential election and one occasion in which it 
decreased. There have been four occasions in which rate of growth of money supply 
has decreased after the presidential election year and one occasion in which it 
increased. He found that the United States has experienced two types of political 
economic cycle: a two year cycle of acceleration and deceleration in real disposable 
income, and a four year presidential cycle of high unemployment early in the term 
followed by economic stimulation, increasing prosperity, and reduced unemployment late 
in the term. The real income cycle is especially the product of election year 
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increases in transfer payments, administrative adjustment of the timing of beneficiary 
payments, and decreases or postponements of taxes. Thus election year enhancement 
of real disposable income is significantly a political and a bureaucratic concern. 
MacRae (1977 and 1981) tested which assumption, myopic or strategic assumption, 
did a better job of explaining macroeconomic policy as reflected by the unemployment 
rate under the hypothesis that the government acts as if voters are myopic with a 
horizon no farther than the end of the election period. In all election periods, the 
relative inflation-unemployment weight is greater under the assumption of myopic 
electorate than under the strategic assumption. Similarly, the associated steady state 
short-run relative weight and inflation goal are higher under the myopic hypothesis 
than under the strategic hypothesis. 
MacRae concluded that there is a potential for a politically motivated business 
cycle with relatively high unemployment and inflation at the beginning of election 
period and then relatively low unemployment and inflation at the end of presidential 
period. However, there is only limited evidence in the U.S. of a potential for the 
cycle because the strategic hypothesis did a better job of explaining excess supply in 
the second Eisenhower, Nixon, and Nixon-Ford administration and the myopic 
hypothesis did a better job only in Kennedy-Johnson and Johnson administrations. 
Paldam (1983) proposed an alternative theory of political business cycle different 
from Nordhaus-MacRae cycle version. In his previous study (1981), the main thrust of 
the alternative theory is that the pressures operating on government are so strong that 
they can not really plan four years ahead for their re-election. Instead, when they 
assume power they simply try to implement their policy, that is they attempt to redeem 
their campaign promises. This effort creates an expenditure boom which leads to 
relatively large economic growth in the year after the election, which is the first year 
to be influenced by the new government. The boom causes prices to escalate in the 
third year, and to regain control of the economy, the government tightens up 
expenditures somewhat toward the end of that year. The pattern that results is almost 
reverse of the optimal one. He concluded that the theory of the electoral cycle should 
be of a more endogenous nature where the short-term political pressures, especially 
mass political pressures, dominate the medium-term planning. 
Dinkel (1981) examined the relationship between economic conditions and voting 
behavior and found that the relationship had not been conclusively demonstrated. The 
basic assumption of all political business cycle models is that government authorities 
wish to be re-elected. In particular, if its re-election is uncertain, government 
authorities adopt economic policies that would be rejected otherwise. For political 
business cycles to occur, it is only necessarily that government believes that it could 
win votes from a policy. Since no one can know in advance how people will vote, a 
government will use all possible policy instruments to ensure re-election, even if 
economic conditions only have a weak effect on voting behavior. 
Alt and Chrystal (1981) studied British fiscal policy under the "revealed 
preference" tradition, in which one infers the motivation of governments from 
assumptions about, and systematic evidence, of their behavior. They used three stage 
least squares to estimate a model in which government consumption, transfer payment, 
government investment, and government revenue were endogenous variables. They 
provided new estimates of the political popularity functions and policy functions in 
British. 
Potts and Luckett (1978) presented a monetary policy function, which is a 
function of unemployment, prices, economic growth, and the balance of payments. 
They concluded that the Federal Open Market Committee does seem to base its policy 
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actions, in part at least, on the macroeconomic objectives of full employment, price 
stability, and economic growth and that the Federal Reserve's ordering of priorities 
among the goals does appear to be influenced by the political tempo of the times. 
3. Summarv 
Much of the literature of theory and empirical studies related to the political 
business cycle can be summarized as Figure 2. For example, unemployment rate or 
inflation rate has decreased during the second half of the election term but has 
increased during the first half of the election term. To be re-elected through great 
popularity, an incumbent regime could manipulate policy choices to generate a business 
cycle. In this context, government's policy measures are determined endogenously. 
The literature and ideas on political aspects of economic policy provide many valuable 
insights into the behavior of government. However, existing theories of political 
economics suffer from some defects. First, most studies relate popularity to economic 
performance in an ad hoc manner and lack a satisfactory theory of voting behavior. 
Second, the public sector is usually not separated into the component which does not 
depend on electorate for survival, for example, the state bureaucracy, monetary 
authorities, and the part which does not depend on re-election, for its survival, the 
legislative and executive branches. There exists, in fact, conflict between these 
components of the public sector, which so far has been ignored. Third, previous 
studies of political economic reaction functions for state expenditure and taxes 
specified these independently of each other and without reference to a complete 
macroeconomic model. Fourth, previous studies of the politically motivated business 
cycle focus on the political trade-off between inflation and unemployment and ignore 
unemployment rate 
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T = election time 
Figure 2. Political business cycle 
popularity. Finally, previous analysis of the stability of political economic system 
(see Fassbender, 1981; Ordeshook and Shepsle, 1982) have failed to take account of the 
discontinuous nature of reaction functions based on satisfying theory. 
From the above empirical studies about politically motivated business cycle,^ we 
may derive general conclusion that there is an interdependent relationship between 
political and economic forces. Thus government authorities could manipulate economic 
^Beyond those empirical studies, Frey (1978) found that in twenty-one out of 
twenty-seven democracies over the period 1960-1972 the growth rate in real 
disposable income was higher in election year than in nonelection years. The 
clearest evidence is Israel. For other empirical evidences, see Alt and Chrystal 
(1981) and Frey and Schneider (1978 and 1981). 
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policy variables to maximize popularity and so could be re-elected in the election. 
In this context, government policy variables are no longer exogenous variables, rather 
they are endogenous variables. 
B. Political Microeconomics 
1. Theories 
a. Governmental intervention Governmental intervention in economic system, 
as forms of income supports, supply control, or barriers to trade, is common 
phenomenon regardless of economic system, capitalist or socialist, developed countries 
or developing countries. In the microeconomic theory, there are two points of view 
about governmental intervention in economic system, negative view point and positive 
view point. The viewpoint of the former is that governmental intervention causes 
distortions in both domestic and international system (Abott, 1979 a; Brandow, 1977; 
Rausser and Stonehaus, 1978). The effects of public intervention, such as income 
support, supply control, price subsidy, or trade barriers, are pervasive. Many of 
these policies have direct effect of transferring wealth from taxpayers or consumers to 
individual producers while transferring risk in the opposite direction. Other 
redistribute wealth and risk within the private commodity systems among various 
participants along a vertical commodity chain. All these policies assuredly distort 
traditional market price mechanism (Rausser, Lichtenberg and Lattimore, 1982; Russel, 
1983). 
The viewpoint of the latter is that governmental intervention is necessary to 
achieve a maximum value of the social welfare function (Ladd, 1986). In a society 
K 
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which has merit goods,^ universal hedonists, externalities in production, public goods, 
persons who apply existence value (sacred values in sociological terms) and persons 
who care about equity or distributive justice, public intervention is necessary to 
achieve a maximum value of the social welfare function because this maximization 
requires that each individuals' marginal rate of substitution differ systematically 
from the social marginal rate of transformation. According to the microeconomic 
theory of perfect competitive market, each firm's price ratio equals its marginal rate 
of substitution and each consumer equate his/her marginal rate of substitution to the 
same price ratio. It is, however, difficult to say that there exist perfect competitive 
market in the real world, rather above six situations do exist in the world. Therefore 
we may say that the competitive are not efficient and do not maximize any social 
welfare function. The existence of any one of these six situations requires 
governmental intervention in market system in order to maximize a social welfare 
function.^ 
b. Liberal-pluralist approach This framework concentrates on forces shaping 
the distribution of income and wealth in the private sector and focusses principally on 
the policy setting process and on the relationship between policy makers and voters, in 
particular under the assumption that legislators are assumed to simply transmit voter 
^The term of "merit wants" stemmed from Musgrave (1959). Merit wants 
represents a means of providing consumer information, of allowing for alternatives, 
and of compensating for an individual's lack of information concerning the impact of 
his actions on other people, in an individual choice framework. And the concepts 
accounts for such things as compulsory education laws and taxes on "merit bads", as 
possible cigarettes and liquor, in an imposed choice framework. The concept of "merit 
goods" does not mean the same things as "public goods", they may be private goods 
according to Pazner (1973). 
^We can apply theory of the second best to investigate the cost of refusing to 
interfere with markets when these six conditions exist. 
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preference; and the possibility that legislators might have interests of their own is 
not considered. 
Individuals have an interest in redistributing income from others to themselves. 
They are presumed to enter into voter coalitions to express their demand to politicians. 
Politicians are motivated by voters and thus satisfy such a demand in order to increase 
their probability of election (see Downs, 1957; Buchanan and Tullock, 1962). As Stigler 
(1970) argued, "as income has become a widely usable basis for income and expenditure 
programs, both the extent of government activities and their income redistribution 
(from higher income level to lower income level) will grow." 
In a real world, there exist some goods that can not be redistributed like health 
and human capital and generally individuals are risk averse. Hence, imperfect markets 
and moral hazard prevent the emergence of private markets that spread the risk of 
disastrously low incomes (Arrow, 1963). Voters may choose to provide such insurance 
through the political marketplace. Basically private or social insurance for income 
interruption is provided via governmental intervention.^ The lower income groups have 
a higher demand for such insurance than higher income groups; as a consequence, the 
higher income groups must be bribed with premium (tax) reductions to persuade than to 
enter the insurance contract. Musgrave's prudent humanitarian model (Musgrave, 1968) 
said that social insurance emerged as a device to force compulsory saving on the less 
prudent and lower income individuals and to protect the prudent and higher income 
individuals. 
The seminal work of Hochman and Rodgers (1969) introduced the Pareto optimal 
income redistribution formulation which in essence transformed issues of distribution 
^The net contribution rate of higher income individuals would be greater under a 
private insurance formation but lower under public welfare schemes. 
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into a question of efficiency. One variant of this formulation specifies that donors of 
taxes derive utility from income levels of transfer recipients. Hence, the donors are 
consequently prepared to support transfer schemes. To donors with similar utility 
functions, the commodity, "increased incomes of the poor," is a collective consumption 
good - an efficient quantity of which can be provided through the governmental 
sector.^® 
Thurow (1973 and 1975) developed a formal job competition model and a theory of 
income redistribution. His model is built upon four empirical observations drawn from 
the U.S. economy: (i) income inequalities fell considerably during the Great Depression 
(Pre-Second World War period) and remained stable after the War; (ii) the political 
popularity of minimum wage policies; (iii) the political acceptability of adequate 
transfer income floors for those who are disabled and elderly and thus unable to work; 
and (iv) the political popularity of income transfers to those who are able to work, 
even if they cannot find employment. In Thurow's model, individual workers who may 
differ in their views of economic justice have reached a consensus that justice is 
linked to relative incomes. Thus the well-being of many of the members is tied 
directly to a normative appraisal of relative incomes. The government is directed to 
implement policies to achieve such desired distribution of income if market mechanisms 
fail to do. 
^®This framework predicted redistribution of income to lower income individuals 
from higher income individuals; some variations of this framework suggest that the 
largest transfer would be made to the poorest while smallest transfer would be made to 
the less poor. If, over time, the income differential between donors and recipients 
remain constant, then size of the redistributive tax transfer will remain constant. 
c. Economic regulation approach This approach was Initiated by Stigler (1970) 
and Peltzam (1976) formalized Stigler's pioneering work and generalized a number of 
his important results. This regulation framework concentrates on the behavioral 
effects of changes in constraints under a regime of stable power relationships. The 
regulator desires to maximize the "majority" defined by the number of potential voters 
in the beneficiary group times the probability that a beneficiary will grant support^ % 
less the number of potential voters in opposing groups times the probability that those 
who are "taxed" will oppose. Peltzam's most critical assumption is that the wealth of 
each number of the potential opposing group is a decreasing function of the transfer 
tax and his general proposition that wealth is not totally inelastic with respect to 
taxes has important implications for the evaluation of the whole range of government 
redistributive policies. 
The choice facing the regulator involves the amount that he asks the beneficiary 
group to spend in campaigns, lobbying, etc., to mitigate opposition as well as the 
amount that he bids for a total dollars transfer to the beneficiary group. To optimize 
for each of these choice variables, it is assumed that the ratio of the beneficiary 
group to the total population is less than unity. The regulator's choice problem is not 
limited to selecting the size of the interest group to benefit or tax but includes the 
selection of an appropriate structure of benefits and costs. 
d. Interest groups and conflict resolution approach This approach admits both 
economic and political markets and a process for resolving conflicting goals. In 
'^The probability of support from the beneficiary group is specified to be a 
function of per capita net benefit. This per capita net benefit measure includes 
dollar spend by beneficiaries in campaign funds, lobbying, and the like to mitigate 
opposition and the cost of organizing direct support of beneficiaries. 
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economic markets, the desired quantities traded by buyers and sellers are equilibrated 
by the price mechanism, while in political markets the levels of powers exercised by 
conflicting groups are balanced through adjustments in the stock of social claims. 
Political markets are presumed to be in equilibrium whenever the stock of legal 
instruments and flow of political rewards adjust to the point where neither politicians 
nor the supporters or opponents wish to alter any variable which affects the form or 
shape of governmental intervention. Through the interaction among economic and 
political markets, participants in one market can create economic rents in another 
markets. In essence, economic groups compete in political markets over the 
distribution of income through tariffs, subsidies, bureaucratic policies, judicial 
processes, regulation, and so on. 
Brock and Magee (1978 and 1979) employed non-cooperative game theory to 
investigate general equilibrium in both economic and political markets. Their 1978 
study analyzed the interaction of economic and political markets. This study assumed 
an economy consisting of individual agents, politicians, firms, and goods which are 
produced and either consumed or used as inputs. In this framework governmental 
intervention leads to losers who would be willing to pay up to certain amount to 
prevent the intervention, while gainers would be willing to offer up to a certain 
amount in order to secure the intervention, where each of these two amounts is 
defined as variation in income required to make individuals indifferent between two 
political equilibria. 
Their 1979 study employed a non-cooperative game theory with politicians acting 
as Stackelberg leaders. In their analysis, tariffs are used throughout as the exemplary 
redistributive policy. Three types of industry lobbies are investigated, the concentrated 
industry, the regulated industry, and the self-policed industry. In a two-politician and 
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a two-lobby game, opposing lobbies with perfect information leads to the protectionist 
lobby contributing only to the high tariff politician. Each competing politicians try to 
maximize their probabilities of election. These probabilities are function of campaign 
contributions from lobbies and the politicians tariff positions. The political market 
equilibria that are obtained from this formulation, regardless of whether information 
is perfect or imperfect, have the properties that increased political power by a tariff 
lobby always cause one politician to increase while the other politician decreases his 
tariff position, that the average tariff position of two politicians may either rise or 
fall with increased power by the tariff lobby, and that increased lobbying power will 
augment the range between the tariff positions of two politicians when the high tariff 
politician increase his position and vice verse when high tariff politician decrease 
his position. 
Becker (1983) presented a theory of the political redistribution of income and of 
other public policies that built on competition among pressure groups for political 
favors, which are defined by occupation, industry, income, geography, age, and other 
characteristics.^^ Active groups produce pressure to raise their political influence, 
where all influences are jointly determined by the pressures produced by all groups. 
The political budget equation between the total amount raised in taxes and the total 
amount available for subsidies implies that the sum of all influences is zero, which 
has a significant effect on the competition among pressure groups. Political 
equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure, the effect 
of additional pressure on their influence, the number of persons in different groups, 
and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies. An increase in deadweight costs 
discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers. 
l^For political pressure group approach, see also Posner (1974). 
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Chappell (1982), however, did not agree with the idea that interest pressure 
groups would affect policy decisions. He developed a model to explain Congressmen's 
voting decisions and contributions to congressmen from interest groups by using 
simultaneous Probit-Tobit model. He concluded that contributions of interest groups 
have no significant impact on congressmen's voting decisions. Votes are most often 
decided on the basis of personal ideology or the preferences of constituents. 
2. Empirical studies 
On the basis of conceptual political microeconomic background of endogenizing 
governmental behavior, a series of empirical studies estimated the governmental policy 
preference or criterion functions and estimated policy instrumental behavior equations. 
These empirical studies focused on the interrelationship between the public sector and 
private sector. 
a. Estimation of criterion functions In the specification and estimation of 
criterion functions for policy formation, various approaches are developed. First, 
Keeney and Raiffa (1976) developed the multiattribute utility analysis which was 
specifically advanced as a method of formalizing trade-offs between objectives under 
uncertainty. Taking the existing preference structure of the decision maker as given, 
they proceed to elaborate a method by which this structure can be made explicit. The 
key concerns of the procedure are the measurement of the objectives and the 
explication of trade-off between objectives under the assumptions of preferential 
independence and utility independence among multiple objectives or attributes. This 
analysis can be formed as 
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n 
KU(Y) + 1 = [Kk.Uj(Y.) + 1] 
i=l 
where, K. and k. are constant and U.(Y.) is the conditional utility function of the 
i-th attribute. If the preferences over lotteries on all attributes depend only on 
their marginal probabilities and not on their joint distribution, then we have additive 
independence and the multiattribute utility function assume the additive form: 
n 
U(Y) = E K.U.(Y.). 
i=l ' ' ' 
Second, Rausser and Freebrairn (1974) presented set of criterion functions in 
which public decision making is treated as a bargaining process between a finite 
number of centralized public decision making groups and/or individuals. They used the 
revealed preference approach to determine weights associated with various preference 
measures or objectives. It is not concerned with individual utilities but with 
measurable quantities. Much like the consumer preference function, it may be revealed 
by policy actions and hence is observable. They define this function as a policy 
preference function. 
They employ revealed preference to capture the estimated parameters. For 
objective or preference measure y.^, the marginal policy preference relation is 
Wyit = k.^ + 2K.^y.^ 
where the objectives y.^ are observable and the coefficients (k.^, K.^) can be 
constructed by revealed preference. It is then a simple matter to derive the marginal 
rate of substitution, Wy.^/Wyj^. They measured the marginal rate of substitution for 
aggregate producer income and the negative of consumer expenditure. 
The contribution of the Rausser-Freebairn analysis is the use of the revealed 
preference approach to determine weights associated with various preference measures 
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or objectives. They empirically investigate U.S. beef import quotas in an attempt to 
ascertain the weightings of consumers' and producers' welfare implicit in past 
governmental policy decisions. The method they use is to assume that a given policy 
represents an equilibrium maximization of the policy maker's criterion function. This 
method allows Rausser and Freebairn to infer the weights appearing in the criterion 
function via the revealed preference approach. This approach, of course, requires that 
the public decision making process be rational and consistent. 
Third, Zusman (1976) applied revealed preference approach to N-interest groups. 
The policy equilibrium is characterized as the outcome of an N-person game. The 
concept of equilibrium employed in this game is Harsany's generalization of the Nash 
cooperative game solution to an N-person game. The solution concept implies that the 
entire cooperative game can be broken into two distinct components. The first is a 
noncooperative subgame in which agents bargain to arrive at a division of the final 
payoff. The division made is determined by the relative strength of the agents and the 
coalition they form. Once the division of the final payoff is determined in the first 
subgame, the second cooperative subgame ensues. In this subgame, all agents jointly 
strive to maximize the size of the total payoff as this will also maximize each agent's 
and/or coalition share. At the equilibrium, the payoff is divided up according to the 
result of the first subgame; the distribution process may involve side payment in each 
phase. 
The final equilibrium is found by maximizing the size of total payoff. As such, 
it is on a political economic frontier which can be defined as 
n 
Max E H.U.(X) 
X i=l  '  '  
where U.(X) is the i-th interest group's utility; X = (x^, Xj, . . . ,  x^) is the vector of 
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all groups' actions; and H. are the relative weightings derived from the assumptions of 
additive utility and the optimality of government policy, this is equivalent to 
n 
MinMax E H.[U.(X») - U.(X,)] 
H. Xq i=l ' ' " ' " 
A 
where 3^ is the observed level of policy instruments. The weights, H., can be thus be 
found by solving the nonlinear programming problem 
Max V 
subject to V <_ U.(XQ) - U.()^), i = 1,2, ..., n 
and the economic constraint structure. 
Zusman employed this method to investigate the Israeli sugar industry assuming an 
additive utility function for each interest group. The groups were the government, the 
Israeli labor federation (representing consumers), and sugar producers. Each of these 
three groups are assumed to have a utility function which is separable in the benefits 
and costs imposed by the sugar subsidy and in the cost of exerting effort to influence 
the level of this subsidy. 
Fourth, Schim van der Loef and Harkema (1979) attempt to incorporate 
uncertainty into the heart of the policy-making process and developed Theil's (1974) 
Random Rational Behavior with revealed preferences. They argue that decision-makers 
should not be viewed as agents optimizing some function under certainty. Instead of 
looking at governmental behavior as optimizing a deterministic criterion function, 
they argue that this behavior is more accurately characterized as random rational 
behavior. The objective of the government under this hypothesis is to minimize losses 
from deviations from policy instrument targets. They proposed a quadratic criterion 
function, in both policy targets and instruments, to be maximized subject to a linear 
constraint system of reduced form equation. 
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In suggesting a revealed preference methodology for the estimation of criterion 
function parameters under random rational behavior. They propose a quadratic 
criterion function in both policy targets (Y) and instruments (X). 
W(X,Y) = a'X + bT + 1/2(X'A X + X'C Y + Y'lC X + Y'B^Y) 
nn n n n n 
to be maximized subject to a linear constraint structure 
Y = R X + S 
n 
where Y is the np vector of policy targets, X is the nq vector of policy instruments, 
and S is a vector of order pn of linear combination of current and lagged exogenous 
variables and pre-first period lagged X and Y. An expected loss function is then 
derived on the assumption of first period error followed by the correct decision: 
L(Xj, = -1/2(X^ - ^)'Q-\X^ -
where is the optimal value of instrumental variables derived from constrained 
maximization process and Q is the leading (qxq) submatrix of where 
K„ = A„ + R'C„ + C R + R'B R 
n  n  n n  n n  n n n  
b. Estimation of behavioral equations Examination of government policy 
formation is equivalent to the direct estimation of instrumental behavior equations. 
There are various approaches to estimate the parameters of these equation systems and 
to quantity the criterion functions. They extend our understanding of the policy 
formation process, especially with respect to verifying the endogeneity of government 
policy decisions. They also support the conceptual link between policy choices and 
interest group preferences. Most of this work has concentrated on partially reduced 
form estimation. It can be classified into two general categories. The first 
category concentrates on the policy formation process. The explanation and prediction 
of government policy determination are major purposes of such studies. These models 
are represented by policy behavioral equations in which the underlying structure 
admits the simultaneous determination of all policy instruments. The second category 
has concentrated on the private sector, stressing the inclusion of policy determination 
as a means of improving the performance and predictability of such private sector 
models. Feedback effects from the private sector to policy formation and vice versa 
have been of special interest. The resulting models have generally had a market 
orientation in which one or more policy instruments have been embedded. Equations 
for the policy instruments have been included in the conceptual or theoretical 
frameworks but are eliminated or treated as predetermined in the empirical models that 
have been constructed. Studies of Rausser and Stonehaus (1978), Camm (1976), and 
Reed and Ladd (1983) for policy analysis belong to the first category and the studies 
of Lattimore and Zwart (1979), Lattimore and Schuh (1976), and Abbott (1979 a and b) 
belong to the second category. 
Rausser and Stonehaus (1978) specified policy behavioral equation system which 
was largely determined by the authors' beliefs as to the nature of policy formation. 
In their study of Canadian dairy industry, they take as a working hypothesis that the 
policy formation process is some sort of bargaining game between interest groups in 
society. Policy instruments such as target returns and support prices for dairy 
products are the dependent variables represented by proxies for consumer, producer, 
and government agency interests. The coefficient estimates are highly reasonable and 
tend to conform the importance of those factors in the process of policy formation. 
One of the most important endogenous variables is the aggregate market-sharing quota. 
Each explanatory variable entering Rausser and Stonehaus' "Endogenous Dairy Policy 
Behavioral Equations" plays a specific role; net target return is a proxy for 
producer's welfare; assumed processing margin represents processor's interests; change 
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in government stocks and government deficit are proxies for taxpayers' interests; the 
consumer price index is a proxy for consumer concerns; and lagged quotas represent 
the government's major reference point. Their quarterly forecasting model of Canadian 
dairy sector consist of 24 endogenous policy variables including the above explanatory 
variables. They conclude that the specification of behavioral equations for both 
private and public sectors allows comprehensive long and short-run forecasts to be 
made not only of supplies, demands, and prices, but also of the important government 
policy variables. Hence the basic conclusion is that for agricultural commodity markets 
which exhibit a high degree of governmental intervention, specification of the correct 
structural form depends on responses of both the private and public sectors, together 
with their feedback effects. 
Camm (1976) developed a price theoretical model of market discrimination to 
isolate variables affecting the size of rents and to determine their impacts. The set 
of independent variables is composed principally of factors affecting supply and demand 
elasticity. It includes such variables as national demand elasticity, percentage of 
acreage devoted to the crop of interest, share of production under order, farm value, 
and variability of crop size. A linear probability model is used to estimate the 
effect of these variables on whether a marketing order was in effect in 1966.^^ 
Reed and Ladd (1983) developed an economic explanation for endogenous 
governmental restrictions on trade in feed grains. The explanation is provided by 
using an econometric model that contain three submodels: (i) one submodel derives 
demand for feed grain imports as the excess demand over domestic supply; (ii) a trade 
^^Camm's study of marketing order derived from Stigler's theory of regulation. 
The view is that the imposition of a marketing order creates rents for producers, 
hence the demand. The greater the rents, the greater the demand for regulation. The 
probability that marketing order will be imposed should thus increase as the transfer 
of income grows. 
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barrier submodel postulates that the government maximizes a utility function that 
incorporates the benefits and costs of trade barriers for feed grain; (iii) a livestock 
sector submodel allows the domestic feed grain market to influence the domestic 
livestock industry. They found that Spain and the UK had domestic feed grain prices 
that differed systematically from the cost of imported feed grains. These countries 
followed domestic policies that insulated domestic feed grain prices from fluctuation 
in world feed grain prices. Because imports depend on domestic prices, it follows that 
the world price or the cost of importing feed grain is not the most appropriate price 
to include in import demand for feed grains. Their results also indicate that the 
difference between domestic price of feed grain and the cost of imported feed grains 
depends on market conditions in the importing country. Real per capita income, the 
volume of feed grain imports, and the lagged domestic prices of feed grains. Their 
results confirm that feed grain imports are affected by a nation's livestock sector. 
But the livestock sector is not an exogenous determinant of feed grain prices and 
imports; feed grain markets affect the livestock inventories. They concluded that 
econometric studies of feed grain imports need to construct models of the importing 
country's domestic economy that measure two-way interactions between feed grains and 
livestock sectors and that allow for public policies that insulate domestic prices 
from world prices. 
Lattimore and Schuh (1976) attempted to integrate endogenous policy formation 
into models of private market response. The pertinent policy objectives are identified 
and used to isolate factors which may have a causal relation on the choice of 
instrument levels. As conditions in the markets under consideration clearly affect the 
correct level of policy instrument for a given objective, these specifications 
generally include feedback effects from the market to the policy formation process. 
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The estimated parameters are used for forecasting purposes and to test hypotheses 
about the structure and objectives of government intervention. 
To find degree of governmental intervention, they take world commodity market 
as an example, that is, they illustrate the resulting price distortion for an 
individual importing country. Prior to the imposition of distorting policy, the 
domestic price (DP) should equal to the world price (WP) when the latter is valued at 
the equilibrium free trade exchange rate and transaction costs are taken in account. 
The two prices will diverge after the policy has been imposed. The difference between 
the two prices, I = DP - WP, can be thought of as measuring the degree of 
government intervention. This intervention takes the form of tariffs, nontariff 
barriers, quotas, export subsidies, producer subsidies, dumping, and undervalued 
exchange rates. They have examined Brazilian government intervention in the beef 
market. They hypothesized that an objective of government policy is to hold down 
consumer prices, especially those affecting middle income consumer, who are seen as 
politically important. The instrument used to accomplish this goal is the 
overvaluation of the exchange rate for these commodities. The level of intervention is 
specified as a function of the free market import price, the rate of increase in the 
general price level, and the overall balance of payments position. The policy 
intervention equation was estimated as one equation in an independent block of a large 
simultaneous equation model of the Brazilian beef industry. They found that 
coefficients are significantly different from zero for both import price and for the rate 
of increase of general consumer price level. These results tend to support the 
hypothesis that the effective subsidy is based on political motivations. 
Abbott (1979 a and b) attempted to use an endogenous policy formation model to 
test series of hypotheses about government intervention in the international grain 
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markets. He specified a model of endogenous determination of the relevant policy 
instrument levels such as consumer prices, producer prices, and stocks released which 
are posed as functions of world prices, domestic production, foreign exchange flows, 
stocks at hand, etc. His model is a simultaneous reduced form representation of some 
unspecified model of government policy formation. His hypothesis that a partial 
adjustment mechanism exists is borne out in a number of cases, especially among the 
developing countries as Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, India, Thailand, Philippines, and 
Egypt. This evidence lends support to the contention that maintaining stable domestic 
prices is an important policy consideration for many of these countries. Such a 
conclusion, however, rest on a weak statistical foundation. The standard errors of the 
estimates are rather larger, and a fair number of the estimated coefficients either 
have perverse sign or exceed the hypothesized upper bound. 
Lattimore and Zwart (1979) have incorporated endogenous determination of 
government policy into their forecasting model of the world wheat market. Using 
specification derived from Lattimore and Schuh (1976) and Abbott (1979 a and b), they 
set up an estimating model for the determination of producer prices and consumer 
prices. The domestic price instruments, in local currencies, are postulated to be 
related to the world price, the exchange rate as a proxy for the rate of foreign 
exchange, the rate of inflation, and open stocks. The equations were incorporated 
into a spatial equilibrium framework which in turn was used for forecasting. Since 
the model was only used for forecasting, few implications for the policy formation are 
offered, and no direct tests of the underlying specification are conducted. 
There are a number of other studies of endogenous policy measures. Huffman and 
McNulty (1985) hypothesized that agricultural extension input is an endogenous 
variable. From a political economic model of competitive interest groups, they derived 
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a behavioral relationship for the public provision of county agricultural extension. A 
similar empirical study about expenditure on agricultural experiment station has done 
by Huffman and Miranowski (1981). Von Witzke (1986) studied the supernational 
European Community (EC) decisions on the common agricultural policy and indicated 
that the supernational EC decisions are endogenous and could largely be extended by 
past income growth and the development of budgetary expenditure prevailing at the 
time of the price decisions. The empirical results corroborate the hypothesis that 
Monetary Compensatory Amounts are integral part of common price decisions. 
3. Summary 
There are various studies on the interdependence of microeconomic performance 
and microeconomic policy. Each characterized theoretical approach focusses on one 
distinguishable viewpoint about endogenized governmental behavior. The theory of 
economic regulation concentrates on the election process; the liberal-pluralist 
approach concentrates on the legislative choice process with some reference to the 
election process; and the interest groups and conflict resolution approach concentrates 
on the election and bureaucratic choice process. 
Empirical studies proceed by directly estimating policy instrument behavioral 
equations or by estimating the criterion functions. Given the constructed criterion 
functions and an appropriate constraint structure, policy instrument or choice 
equations can be derived. None of the criterion functions approaches surveyed, 
however, seem entirely adequate for estimating the effects of power exertion on the 
final determination of policy and the relationship between policy alternatives and 
the generation of political effort. Various empirical results on redistribution of 
wealth may also confirm, or fail to confirm, the various policy formation models and 
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policy determination models. 
Finally, it is to recognized that normative or traditional welfare analysis in 
microeconomics must give some emphasis to implementation. Practically, meaningful 
policy analysis must incorporate positive notions of policy formation. This requires 
the explicit recognition of political markets and their role in distribution. 
Ultimately, an operational policy focus should lead to an integration of normative and 
positive analysis of endogenizing government behavior in the political microeconomics. 
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III. THEIL'S QUANTITATIVE ECONOMIC POLICY MODEL 
The theory of quantitative economic policy (QEP) was pioneered by Tinbergen 
(1961) and others and extended by Theil (1961) and others; see e.g., Fox, Sengupta, 
and Thorbecke (1966). It grew out of the need encountered during the great depression 
of the 1930s and during post-World War II reconstruction and demobilization to provide 
national governments an operational method that they could use to stabilize their 
economies. It has been extended to other areas: most notably economic development. 
The elements of a flexible-target model are (i) the public policy maker's 
preference or welfare function, W, (ii) target variables, which are indirectly but 
purposefully influenced by the policy maker, (iii) instrument variables, which are the 
means available to the policy maker for achieving their objectives (e.g., maximizing 
his popularity to be won in next election) and whose values are determined directly by 
the policy maker, (iv) irrelevant and data variables, which are not required in this 
study., (v) a quantitative model consisting of empirical relationships among the 
variables. Examples of instrument variables are price support level of corn, personal 
income tax rates, tariff rates, unemployment compensation levels, etc. Exemplary of 
target variables are unemployment rate, inflation rate, corn farmers' income, GNP, 
balance of trade, etc. 
One way to study policy rules in macroeconomic models is to confront the optimal 
decision rules with change in the constraints which the policy maker has to face. 
Theil (1964, chapter 8) discussed optimal decision rules under the constraints in 
structural and reduced form equations. By assuming a linear relationship between 
instrumental variables and endogenous variables, Theil's reduced form restriction is, 
as a matrix form. 
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Y = RX + S (3.1) 
where Y is (nxl) of endogenous variables which are indirectly but purposefully 
influenced by the policy maker, X is (mxl) of instrument variables which are the means 
available to the policy maker for achieving his objectives and whose values are 
determined directly by him and of irrelevant variables which measure side effects in 
which the policy maker is not interested, S is (nxl) of disturbance term, and R is 
(nxm) of coefficient and describes the influence of X on Y, so R can be said to 
measure the effectiveness of the exogenous variables with respect to endogenous 
variables (noncontrolled) variables. 
Theirs Lagrangian function for maximizing the welfare function W(X, Y) subject 
to reduced form equations is 
W(X, Y) - A'(Y - RX -S) (3.2) 
where A is a column vector of Lagrangian multipliers. The specific formulation of W 
that has been frequently used is the quadratic 
W(Y,X) = (Y - Y*)'Vy(Y - Y*) + (X - X*)'V^(X - X*) 
where Y* and X* are vectors of desired target levels. W is a quadratic disutility 
function in deviations of actual from desired levels and its value is minimized. 
Minimization gives, then, 
3W/aX + R'A = 0 
aW/aY- A = 0 (3.3) 
where 5W/ax and 3W/aY are the column vectors of the marginal welfare of instruments 
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and noncontrolled variables, respectively. Substituting A = dW/dY into 3W/5X + R'A = 
0 gives 
aw/ax + R'aw/aY = o (3.4) 
For the second-order (stability) conditions, consider the matrix 
W = 
- w W R' -
XX xy 
W W -I yx yy 
R -I 0 
(3.5) 
which is obtained by bordering the matrices of second-order derivatives of the welfare 
function. Then the second-order conditions are the followings: Take an arbitrary 
principal minor of order (n+1) in the matrix of second derivatives of W. Border this 
minor with the corresponding elements of the multiplicative structure. The result is a 
principal minor of order (2n+l) of the matrix W, where additional n elements come 
from derivatives of W with respect to constraint, (3.1): for example: 
a^w/axj^ a^w/axjayj a^w/ax^ay^, r^^ ,r.^ 
a^w/ayjaxj, a^w/ay^^ a^w/ay^ay^, -i, o 
a^w/ay^axJ, a^w/ay^ayj,..., a^w/ay^^, o 1 
rj J -1, 0 0 ,0 
fnl 0 -1 0 0 
For maximization this minor should have the sign of (-1)""*"^ Furthermore, when it is 
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bordered by another row and column of W such that a principal minor of order (2n+2) 
results, it should have opposite sign. 
Questions might be asked about effects on optimal values decided by policy maker 
if the coefficients changes. For example, in demand theory, what is the effect on the 
quantities bought of given changes in the coefficients of the budget constraint, i.e., 
of changes in prices and income. This question might be equivalent to the question, 
"What are the decision errors when decision maker use erroneous coefficients in the 
reduced form equation as constraints." This question leads us to an appropriate 
insight into the dependency of the optimal instrument values on the coefficients of the 
constraints, i.e., on R and S. This dependency can be written as 
functions of the coefficients of the constraints. These equations are called "Optimal 
Reaction Functions". These functions will exist in a range of values of the elements 
of R and S if W has a conditional maximum for any constraint Y = RX + S. Then all 
(m+2n) equations on (3.3) and (3,1) can be written as below; 
X° = X(R, S) 
Y° = Y(R, S) (3.6) 
where X° and Y° is the policy makers optimal value of X and Y, respectively, as 
9W/9x, + ... + r, ,A,+ ... + r ,A = 0 
1 HI ni n 
aw/5y, + ... - A = 0 
-s (3.7) 
+ r X - y 
nm m -^n 
= -s 
n 
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Differentiation of the system (3.7) with respect to any source Sj gives 
1 / 1 * 1  
(3.8) 
where | W | is the determinant of W and | W. . | is the cofactor of the (i,j)-th element 
of I W I. Further, differentiating with respect to rj^; 
m+n+j,h 
m+n+j,m+i 
M / | w |  
, l l / | W |  -  (Aj) I I / I « I k,m+i (3.9) 
These equations (3.8) and (3.9) explain the effect on optimal decision values when 
there are changes of errors or coefficients in the constraints. In other words, the 
decision errors occurred when decision maker use incorrect error terms and/or 
coefficients. 
The further analysis will be simplified by the introduction of more convenient 
notation. Let us partition the inverse of W according to 
(XX) (XY) (X.) 
W ,-l (YX) (YY) (Y.) (3.10) 
(.X) (.Y) (..) 
Partitioned multiplication W = I gives then the following nine matrix relations, 
most of which will be used below; 
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(XX)W^^ +(XY)Wy^ +(X.)R = I 
(XX)W^y +(XY)Wyy -(X.)I = 0 
(XX)R' - (XY)I = 0 
(YX)W^^ +(YY)Wy^ + (Y.)R = 0 
(YX)W^y +(YY)Wyy +(Y.)I = I (3.11) 
(YX)R' - (YY)I = 0 
(.X)W^^ + (.Y)Wy^ + (..)R = 0 
(.X)W^y + (.Y)Wyy - (..)! = 0 
(.X)R' - (.Y)I = I 
Obviously 
Write (xx)|^j^ for the (h,k)-th element of the submatrix (XX) and similarly (xy)|^., (x.)|^., 
etc. The equations (3.8) and (3.9) become then 
9x^/3s. = -(.x).^ 
ay./aSj = -(.y)j. (3.12) 
and also 
axh/5rjk = -x^(.x).k - A.(xx)^^ 
ayi/5r.j^ = -x^(.y).. - A.(xy)^. (3.13) 
Thus, by (3.12) if an error in a constraint varies, instrument variable x^ also 
varies. Because the instrument variable and the error are correlated, x^ is not 
exogenous. This is an internal inconsistency in Theil's work. 
IV. RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS HYPOTHESIS 
A. Rational Expectations 
Most behavioral equations depend critically on expectations about current and 
future economic variables. In the past, the adoption of various ad hoc assumptions 
about the expectation formation process has allowed development of simple economic 
models whose dynamic properties might be analyzed. Still ad hoc assumptions are 
troubling for they are arbitrary. The recent work on the Rational Expectations (RE) 
has received considerable attention because it seems to rely on a good optimizing 
principle, that is individuals should not make systematic mistakes in forecasting the 
future. 
The original hypothesis of RE was postulated by Muth (1961). Emphasizing the 
role of information, Muth stated (1961, p. 316); 
Expectations, since they are informed predictions of future events, are 
essentially the same as the predictions of the relevant economic theory. At 
the risk of confusing this purely descriptive hypothesis with a pronouncement 
as to what firm ought to do, we call such expectations "rational." 
The concept of RE provides a method of interpreting decision makers' use of 
available information in making decisions. RE for a particular variable or a specific 
model is a mathematical expectation conditional on available information. This 
information consists of all available observations on the variables in question and on 
related variables at the time the forecast is made.^'* 
^^Gowdy (1985-86) distinguished Weak RE Hypothesis (REH) and Strong REH. 
The former means that each agent will make the best use of all available information 
(Gomes, 1982). The latter means that expectations about relevant economic variables 
will be correct on the average, that expected values of certain variables will be 
concentrated around the values predicted by economic models, and that predictions 
made by the economic agents will be stochastically correct in the sense that any errors 
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An assumption of RE is that individuals effectively use all available information. 
Information resulting from continuous search activity is readily available and used by 
intelligent transactors in executing current decisions and in forming their 
anticipations of the future. This does not mean that transactors share identical 
global information sets. Rather they possess localized information distributed 
throughout the market mechanism(Wibble, 1984-85). The basic starting point for RE 
is that the individuals in the economy correctly and efficiently use all available 
information^^ (Gowdy, 1985-86). 
The Rational Expectations Hypothesis (REH), thus, implies that individuals will 
collect and analyze a determinate amount of information in formulating their 
expectations if they are maximizing their, say, welfare. However, it does not imply 
anything about perfect foresight because individuals will be subject to a some 
uncertainty. Also it does not imply that RE will always be correct. Rather it is 
claimed that individual economic agents will not make systematic expectation errors 
indefinitely, because they will ultimately learn from experience and modify their 
process of expectations formation. REH does not imply that all economic agents have 
an intricate knowledge of economics and carry with them a detailed model of how the 
are independent of the information used (Lucas, 1977; Sargent, 1973; Muth, 1961). 
^ ^Global information is approximated by the average price and quantity observed 
in any particular market since information is localized and limited in scope. If 
information is deficient and inadequate, then the RE can be supplemented with another 
optimizing theory, that is search theory. Search theory suggest that transactors 
subjectively estimate the marginal benefits and costs of collecting information and 
search until the expected net marginal benefits are zero (see, Stigler, 1961). 
^^Initial RE view ignored costs of obtaining information, that is it was assumed 
that all information is available at negligible cost. 
^^Economic agents could imperfectly use available information when agents lack 
the requisite decision skills to always perfectly respond to information regardless of 
how difficult their decision problems might be. 
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economy actually behaves and possess a complex model of the economy in order to 
learn to avoid making systematic expectation errors. 
B. Rational Expectations and Macroeconomic Policy 
As the REH became the most popular method for generating expectations in a 
recent decade, appropriate econometric methods were introduced to test the REH in 
macroeconomics, especially in the field of stabilization policy [see, Lucas (1973, 
1975, 1977), Frenkel (1977), Barro (1977, 1978), Sargent (1973, 1976), Hall (1978), 
McCallum (1976 a and b), etc.]. Since expectations are not observable, an econometric 
exercise, which assumes that economic agents know the structure of the model for 
entire sampling period, may give credence to the view that RE imagines economic 
agents to be, in Arrow's words, "superior statisticians capable of analyzing the 
future general equilibrium of the system". Furthermore, Sargent and Wallace (1976) 
give some reasons for using the REH approach to econometric modelling: (i) it is 
consistent with the finding that large parts of macro-econometric models typically 
fail tests for structural change, (ii) it can be used to supply an alternative 
identifying restriction, and (iii) it forces one to specify exactly the horizon over 
which the expectations are cast and what variables people are assumed to see: these 
are two things that most macroeconometric models ignore. The RE models under the 
symmetric information structure have a typical characteristic such that if economic 
agents fully understand how the economy actually operate, then any anticipated 
changes in economy policy would result no changes in real economic variables. For 
^^Taylor (1975), however, argued that monetary policy can influence real economic 
variables during periods in which inflationary expectations are transitional. Under 
the assumption of RE that economic agents have learned from their previous incorrect 
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example, it is assumed that an economic agent fully understands the quantity theory of 
money summarized in the exchange equation. If he is informed that the government 
intends to increase the money supply by 10 percent in current fiscal period, but at the 
same time it is announced that some autonomous discovery of crude oil in Ames, Iowa, 
has increased output by 10 percent, he will logically be held to conclude that there 
will be no impact on prices (Shaw, 1984). Generally, it is true for those who believe 
the quantity theory of money, PQ = MV,^^ however, it is not true for others who are 
not informed about government policy announcement or does not understand the 
quantity theory of money. 
Thus, in the context of political business cycle (see Figure 2), there is no 
scope for vote-maximizing policies when economic agents are rational and possess 
complete information about the structure of the economy and the policy rule adopted: 
Incumbent governments cannot, even if they so desire, regularly manufacture 
booms during the latter portion of their elected terms. Prices may be bid up 
and inventories drawn down, but output and employment will be unaffected. The 
argument assures (i) that departures of the unemployment rate from its natural 
level are initiated by expectation errors and (ii) that expectations are formed 
rationally in the sense of Muth. Under these conditions Phillips-type relations 
may exist but will not be exploitable by monetary and fiscal authorities: 
regular attempts by the authorities to manufacture election-time prosperity will 
be anticipated by private consumers and firms, and the real effects negated 
(McCallum, 1978, p. 504). 
The government authorities could have an impact on real outcomes and vote-maximizing 
strategies become feasible when private sector agents do not have complete 
predictions ignores the transition period during which new information affects new 
beliefs. Though the public's optimal predictions of the inflation rate eventually 
converge to a RE equilibrium, in the interim these predictions behave like adaptive 
expectations with a time varying coefficient of expectation depending on the precision 
of the monetary policy. Thus, by choosing a suitable time path for policy, the 
monetary authorities can achieve desired levels of unemployment during the 
transition. 
Where P = price level; Q = output level; M = amount of money supply; and V = 
velocity of money. 
44 
information, when markets do not clear instantaneously, when economic models are 
nonlinear, when the forecast errors are biased and correlated, or when government 
economic policy affects the natural rates (Borooah and van der Ploeg, 1983, and 
Minford and Peel, 1983). 
As a summary of RE model and macroeconomic policy, as far as it concerns 
endogenous government policy choices, it is assumed that the information structure is 
hierarchical^® in the RE model. The available information set for the private sector 
is different from the available information set for the public sector. Any 
competitive group, for example, corn producers, could influence policy making 
processes by lobbying in the USDA or on the Capital Hill to increase, say, corn price 
support. They know other groups, tax payers, consumers, or other industry 
organizations, are also lobbying to secure own interests, however they could not 
recognize other group's relative lobbying power or strategies because the competition 
among interest groups is noncooperative in nature. However, government authorities 
encounter all of the interests of all private groups, understand their rules of 
behavior, consider their own political economic goals, and select policy choices 
expecting responses of the private sector to their choices. So, it may be recognized 
that policy choices are determined through a "policy filter" (see Figure 3). 
The filtered policy measures are announced to the private sector and the private 
sector reacts to announced choices and predicts future policy measures. Therefore, 
^®See Townsend for hierarchical information structure (1983, pp. 555-562). 
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Competitive interest groups (consumers, labor unions, farmers, industries, 
age group, etc.") in the private sector 
lobbying coorporative bargaining 
Governments (the Congress, the Federal Reserve Board 
the Fiscal Authorities, etc.) 
The Policy Filter 
4J-
announcement of policv choices 
expectations 
N 
responses 
The private sector 
Figure 3. The policy filter 
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it is assumed that the available information set for the private sector is a subset of 
the information set for the public sector. This assumption of a hierarchical 
information structure is one of the source for explanation why there exist economic 
fluctuation in the real world and is more practical than the assumption of symmetric 
information structure, which argue that unexpected policy choices or forecasting errors 
affect on the real economic variables. 
C. Rational Expectations and Microeconomics 
1. Rational expectations equilibrium 
To solve a microeconomic problem such as a firm's supply response, a neoclassical 
economist often postulates a representative firm maximizing some constrained objective 
function. One method to solve this problem is mathematical programming. However 
the context of RE framework provides a systematic way to incorporate the effects of 
uncertainty about future prices. Typically this involves assuming that the agent 
wishes to maximize discounted expected profit subject to technological constraints. 
For this example, the solutions generate a set of equilibrium stochastic processes. 
An equilibrium that satisfies the constraints of the stochastic optimization problem 
is known as a Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE) because the representative firm 
is assumed to forecast particular variables by taking conditional mathematical 
expectations using stochastic process actually governing those variables. 
Microeconomics textbooks explain how market prices provide signals to the market 
participants, which facilitate the allocation of resources to their best use. Most 
studies about REE are related to the role and the efficiency of information and the 
conditions for existence of REE. 
Grossman (1981) showed that RE models are radically different from Walrasian 
models in an economy where traders have diverse information. In a world subject to 
random shock, it will be the case that economic agents acquire (or at least attempt to 
acquire) information about future realization of the shocks. Different agents may 
have access to different information. The fact that information is distributed 
throughout the economy has the potential to cause a misallocation of resources relative 
to what would be the case if all agents know everything. Thus, unlike what occurs in 
a Walrasian equilibrium of an economy with heterogenous information, if there is a 
complete set of insurance markets and each person's utility is additively separable 
over time, then there exists a REE which gives the consumers the same allocation as if 
each consumer has access to all the economy's information. In a world with diverse 
information about the future which affects current prices, the Walrasian equilibrium 
does not lead to allocations which are the same as if each trader had all of the 
economy's information. In the long-run, markets will not clear at the Walrasian 
equilibrium prices because traders observing these prices will extract information and 
thus revise their demands. However, in an economy where traders have diverse 
information, the REE allocations are the same as if each trader has all of the 
economy's information. He also showed that as long as there are complete markets and 
additively separable utility, there will exist some REEs which cannot be Pareto 
dominated by a fully informed planner. 
Bray (1981) analyzed a model of a futures market in which both pure speculators 
and producers participate. She assumed that traders who have constant absolute risk 
aversion form RE about the return on holding futures (the basis) and the amount 
producers will produce and that the agents who produce the commodity, which is sold 
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on the spot market, are also futures traders. Their decisions on futures trades are 
affected by their beliefs about both the spot price and their own output. If the 
futures price is a sufficient statistic for information which is gathered about the spot 
price, there is no incentive for dealers to seek such information if it is costly. 
She concluded that the price does not, in general, provide information which is 
equivalent to complete information, and derived two theorems. The first theorem 
establishes that there is a REE in which prices are a sufficient statistic if and only 
if the artificial economy (fully informed economy) prices are a sufficient statistic. 
However, if there are two sources of uncertainty, residual uncertainty about the spot 
price and random endowments of physical output, the futures price is not, in general, 
a sufficient statistic. The second theorem establishes that if there is information 
about only one side (either demand side or supply side) of the spot market, the only 
REE, in which price is a linear function of the private information, is the sufficient 
statistic equilibrium. However, this theorem has serious limitations in dealing with 
the possibility of equilibria is a which the price in nonlinear function of the 
information variables. 
Jordan and Radner (1982) introduced several topics in the general equilibrium 
theory of RE. They defined the term REE as a situation in which traders correctly 
forecast the probability distribution of future prices. Their two equilibrium 
conditions for RE are; (i) prices must clear markets and (ii) traders must have the 
correct expectations conditional on prices and their private information. 
A sound foundation for applying the concept of REE to the predictions about 
market behavior requires the investigation of conditions that would ensure the 
existence and stability of REE. And this investigation has revealed a set of 
problems. First, if markets are incomplete, the existence of REE is not assured by 
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the classical conditions of ordinary general equilibrium analysis. Second, the 
definition of REE is probably in need for some refinements that implying some 
restrictions on the price function and recognize that market transactions are typically 
spaced out in time, so that information revealed by the prices in any one transaction 
can only be used in subsequent transactions. Third, analysis of learning and stability 
needs to take account of the way that traders modify their market models in the light 
of experience, as well as of the usual problems of price adjustment in disequilibrium. 
Finally, since the acquisition of information is an activity that may require the 
expenditure of economic resources, the study of REE would treat the traders' nonprice 
information as endogenously determined, and would take account of the costs and 
benefits of information acquisition. 
Blume and Easley (1984) studied a dynamic market process in which traders 
condition their beliefs about payoff-relevant parameters on past endogenously 
generated market data and current exogenous data. They modeled the dynamic market 
process as a recursive system. Their rationality hypothesis is that traders make 
correct use of exogenous data and predetermined data. Past market data may contain 
useful information without being sufficient for past private information. Estimates 
of payoff-relevant parameters from endogenously generated market data may ultimately 
be just as accurate as parameter estimates from exogenous data. They used statistical 
decision theory as a tool to characterize the limit behavior of the stochastic market 
process. Market process is informative if the beliefs of traders who do not receive 
exogenous information about payoff-relevant parameters converge almost surely to 
certain knowledge of the true parameter value. Their main result is that under 
standard regularity hypotheses, the generic market process is informative. 
There are some studies about REE done by Townsend (1978), Allen (1981), 
Newbery and Stiglitz (1982), Frydman (1982), Laffont (1985), etc. There are also 
studies about learning process under RE done by Cyert and DeGroot (1974), DeCanio 
(1979), Bray (1982), Blume and Easley (1982). 
2. Rational expectations and forecasting 
When REH is applied to microeconomics, there is a question whether it is 
appropriate to test REH at the micro level? According to Muthian expectations, 
individuals should not make systematic mistakes in forecasting the future because 
prediction error must be uncorrelated with the entire set of information that is 
available to the individual at the time the prediction is made. However, various 
empirical studies of REH at the microeconomic level indicate individuals do make 
systematic errors. In the recent study Lovell (1986) demonstrates that the cumulative 
empirical evidence does not establish that the received doctrine of RE dominates 
alternative hypothesis about expectations and he concludes that the weight of empirical 
evidence is sufficiently strong to compel us to suspend belief in the REH. 
Hirsch and Lovell (1979) analyzed the Manufacturers' Inventory and Sales 
Expectations Survey which was conducted quarterly by the U.S. Department of 
Commerce from late 1959 through 1976. They reported that the sales expectations of 
individual firms are biased, which contradict Muth's RE model: some firms are 
perennial optimists, generating overestimates of true sales, while others are perennial 
pessimist, usually underestimating sales volume. The REH asserts that the variance of 
actual realization will exceed the variance of forecasts and they found that for a 
sizable proportion of firms (about 35 percent of the 83 firms responded to the survey 
in the fourth quarter of 1964), sales anticipations have a larger variance than sales 
realized. They concluded that in empirical work the most appropriate assumption to 
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make about expectations, when anticipations are not directly observable depends on the 
level of aggregation. 
Two studies done by de Leeuw and McKelvey (1981 and 1984) exploited the 
evidence on the price expectations of business firms provided by the responses of the 
Year-end Survey of Business Expenditures on Plant and Equipment conducted by the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis since 1970. They (1981) reported that the expected price 
changes are somewhat more accurate than simply forecasting the same rate of inflation 
as the last year. They also found that the two rounds of OPEC oil price hikes caused 
major errors in the anticipated prices of goods and services sold. For example, the 
expected percent change in price in 1974 was only 5.3 percent while the actual hike 
was 16 percent; but for 1975 the expected inflation rate of 8.8 percent fell just 
short of the actual 8.9 percent. In their second study (1984), they worked with 
both individual firm data and with grouped data in order to mitigate the problem of 
errors in the variables. They found that the regressions of the actual rate of increase 
in the sales price on the anticipated change violate REH because the coefficients of 
anticipated price were substantially less than unity on both grouped and firm 
disaggregated data and sum of coefficients was not 1.0. The sum of coefficients should 
equal to 1.0 to indicate unbiased expectations. Expected price change is determined by 
a variety of variables, including lagged expected rates of inflation and recently 
observed changes in the rate of price change. 
Leonard (1982) analyzed data on employer's wage expectations provided by the 
Endicott Survey on average starting wages for inexperienced college graduates. Data 
for eight occupational categories are collected from a sample of 170 large and medium 
sized corporations. Expectations appear to be biased downward, for in each of the 
eight occupational categories employers underestimate the wage they will have to pay 
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new recruits because they underestimate demand for their products. Thus forecast 
errors are not explained by misperceptions of inflation or of either the expected or 
the unanticipated money supply change. 
D. Rational Expectations in a Simultaneous Equation System 
A typical macro-econometric model under the REH consists of a set of 
simultaneous equations describing the behavior of the components of the model. This 
section uses the following modofication of Wallis' (1980) or Fisher's (1982) REH model 
of a linear simultaneous equations system. 
BTf, + + P;):,, + P,):,,. IJ, (4J) 
A 
where and are (gxl) vectors of observed and expected endogenous variables, 
respectively; is (kjXl) vector of exogenous variables whose future values are not 
known, is (k^xl) vector of predetermined variables which contains time trends and 
seasonal variables whose future values are known exactly, X^^ is (k^xl) vector of 
instrument variables whose future values are not known, thus future values of and 
X^j must be predicted. A and B are (gxg) matrices; P. is (gxk.), for i = 1,2, 3, 
matrix of constant coefficients. 
Under the REH, expectations are essentially the same as predictions of the 
relevant economic theory and hence depend specifically on the structure of the 
relevant system describing the economy (Muth, 1961). Therefore, it is necessary to 
make some assumptions about the formation of expectations before parameters of the 
53 
system can be estimated.^ ^  
Let I. , be the set of information available at time t-1. REH assumes that Y = 
t-1 t 
E[Yj| j]. Taking conditional expectations of (4.1) and assuming E[UJ I^ j] = 0 
yields 
(B + A)%=. P,X„ (4.2) 
A A 
where = E[X.J j] for i = 1, 3. Solving expression (4.2) for and 
substituting the result into (4.1) expresses the model in terms of variables that are 
observable, or that become observable after specifying models for generating Xj^ and 
^3f 
BYj - A(B+A)"^Pj^^ + PjXj^ - A(B+A)"^P2X2^ + P^X^^ 
- A(B+A)"'P3?^J + P^Xg^ - = 0 (4.3) 
The reduced form of the system becomes 
Y^ = MPj>^^ - B'^PjXjj + (M - B-^PgXg^ + MP3?^j - B'^P^X^^ + B'^U^ (4.4) 
where M = B ^A(B+A) The errors in rational expectations of Y^, the difference 
between realized values of Y^ and predicted value, are 
Y, - Y, . f B-'U, (4.5) 
^^A necessary condition for identification in this system is that there are more 
exogenous variables than anticipated variables (Wallis, 1980, p. 63). 
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From (4.2) through (4.5), it can be found that REH models depend on different 
assumptions about and Some possible assumptions are presented. 
1. REH.l 
Wallis (1980) and Fisher (1982) have proposed using ARIMA models for generating 
Xj^ and Xj^. It is sufficient here to use two first order autoregressive models 
^lt=fl^lt-l + ^lt (4 6) 
^3t ^ ^3^3t-l ^3t (4.7) 
where Wj^ and w^^ are white noise processes independent of U^. The set of equations 
to be estimated is (4.3), (4.6), and (4.7). In REH.l, expressions (4.6) and (4.7) are 
assumed to hold for all time periods in the sample period (t = 1,2, ..., T) and also 
to hold in the post sample periods (t = T+1, T+2, ...). Equation (4.3) imposes a number 
of restrictions on the coefficients, e.g., letting G. = A(B+A)~^P., it requires P. = 
(B+A)A ^G. for i = 1, 2, 3. It is not possible to obtain unique estimates of the 
structural parameters, A, B, P., without imposing these restrictions. Thus estimating 
the structural coefficients involves a complex, nonlinear estimation procedure (see 
Wallis (1980) for discussion of estimation methods). 
2. REH.2 
Taylor (1979) in effect assumed perfect foresight in predicting Xj^ and X^^; 
%t " ^ It (4 8) 
%t = ^3t (4-9) 
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for all t. This includes the situation in which the rule for determining is known 
and changes in a known way, e.g., (4.7) with w^^ = 0 and f^^ known holds fort =1,2, 
..., T and 
%3t - %:3t = "(st-l + Q (4 10) 
with F and Q known holds for t > T. Here, of course, the error in the rational 
expectations of is 
3. REH. 3 
A third possibility, and the last one to be considered here is for (4.7), = 
fgXg^ J + Wj^, to hold during the sample period but for a different model, e.g., 
%t " ^ 3t " ^ ^3t-l Q (4.11) 
with F and Q unknown in the post sample period. Substituting (4.11) into (4.4) 
results in 
Y, - - B-'P,X„ 4. (M - B-')PjX2, + - fl-'PjXj, 
+ MP^Q + B"^Uj (4.12) 
If we have estimated M, B, and P^ and can guess F and Q, we can estimate (4.12) by 
replacing - B'^P^X^^ in equation (4.4) by MP^FX^^ ^ - B'^P^X^^ + MP^Q and 
computing MP^Q. If, however, we have estimated the products MP^ and B'^P^ but not 
its three component matrices M, B, and P^ we can not estimate (4.12) from the sample 
data and a priori guess of the values of F and Q. 
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V. SYNTHESIZING QUANTITATIVE ECONOMIC POLICY MODELLING 
AND RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS HYPOTHESIS 
The theory of quantitative economic policy (QEP) rationalizes the public policy 
process. It assumes all people, those in the private and in the public sectors, are 
rational, informed, and goal oriented. This theory reached its maturity before the 
Rational Expectations Hypothesis (REH) had a significant impact on the economic 
profession. The QEP fails to account for effects of people's expectations of public 
policy choices upon their behavior. 
The REH assumes, under a hierarchical information structure, that the public 
sector is rational, informed, and goal directed, and that individuals in the private 
sector are goal oriented in their behavior, myopically (or tunnel visioned) rational, 
and informed. These individuals have a good deal of information about the operations 
of the private sector: Muth's relevant economic theory. Muth (1961, p. 316) wrote 
"expectations, since they are informed predictions of future events, are essentially 
the same as the predictions of the relevant economic theory." Economic theory does 
not explain or predict future political events or public policy choices. It leaves 
that job to political scientists. From its very beginning most work on the REH has 
ignored the work on the QEP and treated the operation of the public sector as 
exogenous or stochastic. In the REH, the public sector makes policy choices that have 
predictable effects (through "relevant economic theory") upon the private sector. But 
most REH work does not try to explain these choices. The QEP, on the other hand, 
does treat public choices as endogenous; it considers effects of private decisions upon 
public choices. 
Both the QEP and the REH are of value, but each is incomplete and it is 
57 
worthwhile to synthesize the two. Taylor (1979) tried to synthesize the QEP and the 
REH and derived optimal monetary policy rule. This chapter discusses some possible 
assumptions underlying both the QEP and the REH and presents some possible 
syntheses that are different way from Taylor's and that are in the context of political 
economy. This chapter casts doubt on the validity of some claims to conceptual 
superiority of the REH and questions some of the conclusions of the REH under the 
hierarchical information structure. This chapter also demonstrates the existence of an 
internal contradiction in the assumptions of the QEP models. 
Crotty (1973, pp. 1025) pointed out that econometric estimation of macroeconomic 
models under the assumption that the policy variables are exogenous rather than 
endogenous may be subject to important specification error. To show what is the 
specification error and how the policy variables are endogenously determined, he 
assumed that the government has a preference function which orders possible outcomes 
related to a set of economic instruments and goal variables. Crotty used "the Theirs 
framework to demonstrate explicitly the serious nature of the specification error that 
may arise if the preference function underlying government policy is ignored in 
macroeconometric work" and concuded that ".... Therefore, the parameters of the 
economic model will have to be estimated jointly with those of the state preference 
function." 
The synthesis of the QEP and the REH allow us to draw differences between 
econometric regression with government preference function and without, a difference 
that was ignored in Taylor's synthesis. This study will call these differences 
specification errors as Crotty did. The synthesis of the QEP and the REH also allow 
us to investigate Lucas' (1976) well known critique of econometric policy evaluation 
under the assumption of endogenizing government policy variables. 
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A. Synthesize QEP and REH 
The total number of syntheses the QEP and the REH depends on the number of 
assumptions claimed in the QEP and the REH. The possible underlying assumptions are 
summarized as follows: 
Value of Xg^ known to the private sector A1 
unknown to the private sector A2 
Preference function Xjj is not included B1 
Xj^ is included B2 
Time period multi-period optimization CI 
single period optimization C2 
Information based on L , I- 1 D1 
based on D2 
Lagged dependent included in structural 
variables equations 
excluded from structural 
El 
equations E2 
The first assumption about the value of has already been discussed. A1 and 
A2 assumptions are equivalent to the REH.2 and the REH.l, respectively. Both A1 and 
A2 treat as endogenous variables. The difference between A1 and A2 is awareness 
59 
of contents of the policy filter (see Figure 3). The REH.l assume that the private 
sector can not fully understand what goes on inside the policy filter, under the 
hierarchical information structure, so that the private sector makes predictions about 
policy rules according to (4.7). However, the REH.2 can be reinterpreted as assuming 
that the private sector is able to fully recognize what goes on inside the policy 
filter, so that it has perfect foresight about policy rules. 
For the second assumption of formulation of the preference function, the 
endogenization of the policy variables claims that should be included in the 
preference function because is a part of the endogenous variables. There are some 
arguments for including the policy variables in the preference function. Theil (1964, 
p. 80) argued that the desired level of the policy variables affect the preference 
level directly and also indirectly via their influence on the noncontrolled variables. 
Okun (1972, pp. 128-134) pointed out that some policy variables may be preferred 
because they are less costly to use than others and there are costs of changing 
policies. Therefore, to incorporate influence of the desired level of policy 
instrumental variables on preference level and to reduce instrumental costs, it is 
necessary to contain the policy variables in the government preference function. 
The third time period assumption for optimization will be discussed. Taylor's 
synthesis is based on assumption CI and the synthesis #1 is based on C2. Alternative 
CI is assumed to represent minimization (maximization) of undiscounted (or discounted) 
sum of expected social loss (welfare) over several periods while C2 is assumed to 
represent minimization (maximization) of social loss (welfare) in a single period. It 
should be noted that solutions Y^, at any time period t under CI might not be same as 
optimal solutions under C2, because CI claims the sum of expected loss for whole 
period, and thus optimal solutions for X^^ under CI may not be equal to optimal 
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solutions under C2. The difference between solution value of is expected to show 
differences between multi-period government optimal behavior for policy choices and 
single period optimal behavior. 
The fourth distinction depends on assumption about available information set, I. 
D1 assumes that the decision makers have no information about current period t, but 
have all possible information through t-1 period, j, to make decisions for current 
period. Under D2, the decision makers have all possible information through the 
current period, 1^, to make decisions. We should note that whether the disturbance 
term, U^, is included in the available information set or not. Theoretically, if is 
included in under D2, this assumption means decision maker can make no errors at 
all, so this assumption is unrealistic. However, we may assume that decision makers 
have some partial information on for the period t and this partial information on 
can be used as a proxy for U^. For example, we may think of the monetary policy 
rules based on yearly data. Unlike tax rules or price support programs for 
agricultural commodities, the monetary policy rules are determined through the 
fractional reserve banking system and nonuniform reserve requirements and can flexibly 
be adjusted several times, say, biweekly, monthly, or quarterly, within a year. In 
this case, we may assume that the policy makers have some information available late 
in year t on the value of U^ because they have observations on unexpected (expected) 
developments during part of the year. As another example, we may think of annual 
demand analysis of any specific commodity, say beef. Beef consumption occurs very 
often, daily or weekly. When we analyze annual beef demand we sggregate daily (or 
weekly) beef consumption in a year. Therefore, as far as we are concerned about U^ 
in the current information set, it represents partial information on U^. 
The fifth assumption is existence of lagged dependent variables in structural 
61 
equation; El, or nonexistence; E2. Under El, we need to make assumptions on possible 
serial correlation problem among disturbance terms. Of course, there are other 
possible underlying assumptions, but this study ignores the others. Since there are 
five basic assumptions for synthesizing the QEP and the REH, there are 2^ = 32 
possible syntheses. This section will discuss three syntheses out of 32 possible 
syntheses and present numerical comparisons of the syntheses in the next chapter. 
1. Synthesis #1: A2-B2-C2-D2-E2 
This synthesis will (i) use expressions (4.1), (4.6), and (4.7) to model the 
behavior of the private sector of the economy, and (ii) treat as a vector of the 
QEP policy instrumental variables. Treatment (i) is consistent with the common REH 
assumption of myopic rationality and information. Both (i) and (ii) are consistent 
with the QEP assumption that policy instruments are endogenous. 
Consider the government preference function,for a single time period, 
E[W(Yj, Xj^) 1 = E[l/2(Yj - Yp'G(Yj - Y * )  
+ 1/2(X3j - X*^)'H(Xg^ - X*p I Ij] (5.1) 
where G and H are symmetric weight matrices (gxg) and (k^xk^), respectively, and E 
denotes conditional expectations. This quadratic disutility function is assumed to be 
continuous and twice differentiable. To minimize (5.1), it is assumed that the 
government is facing the decision "environment" describing private sector's behavior 
the context of political economy, it is assumed that if the government 
authorities could minimize this loss function, that is, stabilize price fluctuation 
(of corn), then they could maximize their popularity and thus could win in next 
election. 
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expressed as (4.1).^^ 
Under the QEP, the government's optimal decision rules are stated subject to 
reduced form equation of (4.1). To obtain the reduced form constraints, substitute 
(4.7) into (4.4) and assume the private sector's expectations rule as E[X^^ | Ij_j] = 
fjXjt i under the hierarchical information structure. Then (4.4) becomes 
\ = MPA, - - B-'PjXj, * fi-'u, 
(5.2) 
where M = B ^A(B+A) \ Let A' be a row vector of Lagrangean multipliers, and assume 
an interior solution. Then the first order conditions for minimizing (5.1) subject to 
(5.2) are 
ÔL/9Y^ = G(Y^ - Yp - A =0 (5.3) 
= H(X^^ - Xy - A = 0 (5.4) 
3L/9A = 0 (5.5) 
Define D = (H + P^'B GB P^) 0 and D is assumed to be a nonsingular for unique 
solutions. Then the solutions for X^^ and Y^ are 
X^ = DHX*^ - DPg'B"'GY» + DP^'B'^'GMPj^^ - DP^'B"^ GB'^PjXj^ 
+ DP2'B"''G(M-B"^P2X2J + DP^-B'^GMPjf^X^jj + DP^'B"'GB" 
(5.6) 
^This simultaneous equation system may include behavioral equations derived by 
optimizing process of private sector like demand function, consumption, supply 
function, etc., technical equations like production function, definitional equations 
or institutional equations like tax rules and regulations, and equilibrium conditions. 
Let N = (Ig - B'^PJDPJ'B'^'g). 
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YJ = - B'^P^DHX»^ + B'^P^DP^'E'^GY* + NMPj>^^ - NB"^PjXJ^ 
+ MM-B'SPgX^^ + NMPgfgXg^_^ + NB'^Uj (5.7) 
It is assumed the second order conditions are satisfied. 
It should be noted that optimal solutions for X^^ and are expressed as 
functions of disturbance term U^. As mentioned earlier, inclusion of term 
represents possesion of partial information on U^. Also equation (5.6) shows that the 
assumptions of the QEP are internally inconsistent. The policy instruments X^^ are 
functions of U^, hence are endogenous. This inconsistency with the initial assumption 
that policy instruments are exogenous is not a peculiarity of this synthesis. It is a 
feature of the QEP modelling. Theirs equation (3.12) is 3Xj^/3Sj = - (.x)j^, where 
(.x)jj^ is an element of the inverse of the bordered Hessian. The vector S contains 
the disturbances from the structural equations. This equality shows that any variation 
in disturbances that affects Sj also affects the h-th policy variable. Consequently, 
x^ is not independent of the errors and is not exogenous. 
To solve for Y^, (5.7), (5.6) was substituted into (5.2). (5.7) is truly a 
reduced form equation; it does not include X^^. The variable Y® is identically the 
variable Y^. 
The errors in rational expectations of Y^ can be expressed, from (4.5), as 
- V ^  - V - *lt' ' - 4' (5 8) 
Under the assumption of Dl, E[W(Y^, X^^) | I^ j], that is E[U^ | I^ j] = 0 and if it is 
64 
assumed that E[U^ | 1^] = 0, then not only terms in (5.6) and (5.7) disappear but 
also above argument about internal inconsistency of the QEP is no longer exist. 
2. Svnthesis #2: A1-B1-C2-D2-E2 
A simpler synthesis of the QEP and the REH is obtained if (5.1) is replaced by, 
E[W^ I = E[l/2(Yj - Yp'G(Yj - Y * )  \  I^] (5.9) 
which does not contain policy variables and (5.2) is replaced by, (5.10), employing 
the REH.2 assumption, 
= (M - B'')(PjXj^ + + PgXg^) + B'^U^ (5.10) 
This is the kind of welfare function and constraint Taylor (1979) used. The first 
order conditions for minimizing W are expressions (5.3) and (5.5) and 
aL/aXj^ = P^'(M - B"^)'A = 0 (5.11) 
The solution that minimizes expected is easily obtained. A solution to (5.11) is 
A = 0 and Y^ = Y* satisfies (5.3) condition and the constraints become 
Y, - y; = (M - B-')(P,X„ . PjXj, . P3X3,) • B-'u,. 
Therefore, the solution for the vector of government policy instruments is derived from 
P3'(M-B"S'G(M-B"SP3X3J = Py(M-B"^)'GY* 
- P3'(M-B"S'G(M-B"S[PJXjj + P^X^J - P3'(M-B"')'GB"'U^ (5.12) 
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where Pg'(M-B" ^  ^ )P^ is a (k^xk^) matrix and assumed to be a nonsingular. In 
most real life modelling situations, we expect g > k^, the number of endogenous 
variables exceeds the number of the policy instruments. From (5.11) if A ^ 0 and 
Pj'(M-B V = 0, then the value of optimal solution for will be infinite. 
It is well known that the optimal and unique solution for the linear-quadratic 
maxization problem exist when (i) the objective function is strictly concave and the 
feasible set is also convex and (ii) all variables, endogenous, exogenous, and 
decision variables, are bounded and closed set (see Chiang, 1984, chapter 12). Even 
though (5.9) excluded vector of endogenized decision variables, (5.9) is concave 
and the constraint (5.10) is linear, the first order conditions may guarantee optimal 
solutions, because substituting in (5.10) into (5.9) still satisfies linear-
quadratic optimization conditions. Again, under the assumption of Dl, E[WJ I^ j], 
the terms in (5.12) disappear. 
3. Svnthesis #3: A1-B2-C2-D2-E2 
Another possible synthesis of the QEP and the REH is to modify Taylor's 
preference function to include endogenized policy variables as in (5.1) with the same 
assumption about constraint as in Synthesis #2. The first order conditions for 
minimizing expected subject to (5.10) are expressions (5.3), (5.4), and (5.5). In 
this case, the solution for the vector of policy variables is obtained from 
[H + P3'(M-B"^'G(M-B"^)P3]X3^ 
= HX*^ + PJXM-B'^'GY* - [P3'(M-B"b'G(M-B"^)](PjXjj + P^X^^ 
- PjXM-B'^'GB'^Uj (5.13) 
Since [H + Pg'(M-B S'G(M-B ® matrix of (k^xkg) and assumed to be a 
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nonsingular, there exist unique solution for the vector of Difference of the 
solutions for between the synthesis #2 and #3 is existence of H term in LHS and 
HX^^ term in RHS of (5.13). Under the Dl, term can be drop out from (5.13). 
B. Specification Errors 
From the synthesis #1, we may derive differences between econometric regression 
with government preference function and without. Equation (4.3) and (5.7) are treated 
as the estimable system of structural equations in the REH. To obtain a similar 
system to (4.3) from Synthesis #1, pre-multiply (5.7) by B, then 
BY® + PgDHX*^ - PjDPj-B"^ GY* - BNMPj^^ + BNB'^PjXj^ 
- BN(M-B"^)P^X2^ - BNMP^fjXjj j - BNB'^U^ = 0 (5.14) 
It has already mentioned one source of specification bias present in (4.3) and 
(4.4) that is absent from (5.7) and (5.14): the policy vector X^^ appears in (4.3) 
and (4.4) but not in (5.7) and (5.14). Expression (4.3) is not a reduced form for the 
public sector, whereas (5.7) is. This specification error can be reinterpreted from 
an econometric viewpoint if we assume the economic agent has information about all 
current and past values of the variables. Then the endogenized policy variables, X^^, 
are correlated with disturbance term. Thus, regression (4.3) or (4.4) results 
inconsistent estimators and the policy analysis based on inconsistent estimators may 
result in misleading policy advise to the government. 
Theil (1961) introduced a definition of specification error which may occur on 
estimation of econometric model. Suppose that Hypothesis is true. If we omit any 
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variables which are included in the true model or substitute some variables into the 
true model under alternative hypothesis, then the estimators under even they 
are unbiased estimators, differ from the estimators under H . Theil named this 
0 
difference in assumptions as specification error and differences in estimates as 
specification bias. 
According to Theirs definition, we can derive some specification errors. The 
first specification error in (4.3) and (4.4) is the exclusion of relevant variables; 
(5.7) and (5.14) contain and Y*. A second source is inappropriate restrictions; 
the restriction on the coefficients in (4.3) are quite different from those in (5.14). 
It may simplify comparisons between them by noting that 
BNM = B(Ig - B'^P^DP^'B"'G)B"'A(B+A)"^ 
= A(B+A)"^ - P^DP^'B"^ GB"^A(B+A)"^ 
Restrictions on coefficients in (5.14) include some elements not even present in 
(4.3): namely G and H, and restrictions on coefficients of and Y*. The 
restrictions in (4.3) are simpler than those in (5.14). For example, restrictions on 
A 
Pg in (4.3) involve only the coefficients of and X^^. In (5.14) the restriction 
on Pg involve all coefficients because Pg is an element of D and of N. 
Another difference is obtained from a comparison of (4.5) and (5.8). According 
to the REH, the difference between actual and expected values of Y^ is entirely due to 
random effects: errors in expected exogenous variables, and errors in the structural 
equations. Substitution (5.6) into (5.8) shows that the differences between Y® and Y^ 
are not random errors. The difference is made up of several systematic components; 
Xg^ and Y* are two of them. Even if 5^^ = Xj^, Y^ - is affected by the difference 
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between DP^'B"^ GMPj and DF^'B ' GB 'Pj. The difference is affected by the 
A 
levels of and Xj^. It is likewise affected by the levels of and 
C. Econometric Policy Evaluation: Lucas Critique 
Lucas (1976) concluded about the structure of econometric models in his well 
known critique of econometric policy evaluation as follows: 
Given that the structure of an econometric model consists of optimal decision 
rules of economic agents, and that optimal decision rules vary systematically 
with changes in the structure of series relevant to the decision maker, it 
follows that any change in policy will systematically alter the structure of 
econometric models. 
He also pointed out that 
If the policy change occurs by a sequence of decisions following no discussed or 
pre-announced pattern, it will become known to agent only gradually, and then 
perhaps largely as higher variance of noise. In this case, the movement to a new 
0(A) [modification of the behavioral parameters], if it occurs in a stable way at 
all, will be unsystematic, and econometrically unpredictable. If, on the other 
hand, policy changes occur as fully discussed and understood changes in rules, 
there is some hope that the resulting structural change can be forecasted on the 
basis of estimation from the past data of 5(A) (where 6 and A represent fixed 
parameters of the economic structural equation and of the policy rules equation, 
respectively]. 
Lucas' criticism established an important step in the development of rational 
expectations and the evaluation of policy effectiveness. For example, Kydland and 
Prescott (1977) presented an implication of rational expectations for policy choices, 
that is, if policy makers are following one rule at one time, they may find it optimal 
to switch to another rule at some future time. 
Under changing policy rules, Lucas found that the REH become implausible. For 
example, Lucas and Sargent (1981, p. xxxvii) pointed out that "if the private agents 
are confronted with a planned sequence ... of time-varying government rules, it is 
harder to imagine that agents can successfully figure out the constraints that they 
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face. ... assumption of rational expectations is more plausible when agents are 
assumed to face a time-invariant ... sequence, and that more reliable predictions 
about the consequences of alternative regimes can be made under this assumption." In 
other words, if the assumption of rational choice in a stable world is inapplicable, 
then it is impossible for us to understand or predict the effects of policy change.^^ 
In these points, above the REH.l cast doubt on the validity of the claims to 
conceptual superiority of the REH and Lucas' critique of econometric policy evaluation, 
because the rational expectations specification, (4.7) is the improper way to specify 
the model. Whereas, the REH.2 does not cast doubt, rather it supports Lucas' critique. 
In other words, under the REH.l, the private sector does not fully understand inside 
the black box, (5.6), and makes myopic prediction rule for Under the REH.2, on 
the other hand, the private sector can figure out inside the black box and thus make 
perfect forecasts of Under the REH.l, proper account of changes in coefficient 
caused by changes in public policy requires knowledge of structural parameters; it 
cannot be done if we have only knowledge of reduced form parameters (see the 
previous discussion of the REH.3). 
One of the virtues of the REH is claimed to be its ability to take proper account 
of changes in coefficients caused by changes in public policy. But this is a false 
claim to superiority in RE models that use the assumption of exogenous (or black box 
determination) of public policies to study an economy in which public choices are 
^^Whiteman (1986) also pointed out that "if agent's rational expectations, 
particularly of future values of policy variables, are the only source of reduced 
form parameter variation ..., the parameters of the expectational difference 
equations are invariant to changes in policy rules. Thus, the policy problem can be 
viewed as one of maximizing the policy maker's objective function subject to a 
difference equation (or set of equations) which differ from ordinary difference 
equations (i.e., constraints) because of the presence of expectations." However, Sims 
(1985) argued that even under time-varying parameter assumption, Lucas' critique is 
critiqueable. 
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endogenous. This claim is derived from the following kind of argument. Substitution 
of (4.6) and (4.7) into (4.4) yields 
- + (M-B"')P2X2f + MP^f^X 3 3 3t-l - + B"^U| 
(5.15) + MPjWj^ + MPgW^^ 
If (4.7) is replaced by (4.11), the coefficient of X^^ j changes to MP^F and the 
equation acquires an added term MP^Q. If we have estimated the elements of A, B, 
Pg, and fj and know F and Q, we can adjust the X^^ j coefficient matrix from MP^f^ 
to MPgF and can compute the product in MP^Q. If, however, we have only estimated 
product MPgfg, and not its three component matrices, we can not adjust the X^^ j 
coefficient matrix and cannot compute the new matrix MP^Q.^^ 
In order to predict under new structure, therefore, it is necessary to 
estimate all structural parameters, i.e.. A, B, Pj, P^, Pj, fj, and f^. To accomplish 
this it is necessary to model the formation of RE. This is a spurious claim to 
superiority for REH because it applies inappropriate restrictions to estimate an 
incorrectly specified model. When public policy choices are endogenous, changes in 
determination of public policy are represented by variations in Y*, X*^, G, or H, which 
affect Y^ and X^; replacement of (4.7) by (5.15) is simply the replacement of one 
specification error by another. 
^^Wallis pointed out that knowledge of the reduced form coefficients but not the 
structural coefficients is usually sufficient for the traditional econometric policy 
evaluation under unchanged structure (Wallis, 1980, p.71). 
D. Summary 
In summary, some claims to superiority of RE models and inferences from RE 
models about economic behavior are false when RE models that assume exogenous 
policy choices are applied to a world of endogenous policy choices. The claims may be 
true in RE models that broaden the assumptions of myopic rationality and awareness to 
allow agents in the private sector to have as much information about the public sector 
as they have about the private sector. But it is recognized from (5.15) that 
broadening the assumption will considerably complicate the statistical estimation 
process. It will also require us to improve our understanding of the public policy 
process. 
The syntheses in this study contain a hierarchical information structure. The 
public sector is informed on the behavior of the private and public sectors; but the 
private sector is only informed about the private sector. In principle at least we 
can equalize the amount of information of the public and private sectors by 
integrating QEP, REH, and game theory. Then the outcome depends upon the kind of 
game assumed (see Chow, 1981). 
The framework of endogenizing policy variables under the REH can be converted 
easily to dynamic policy game. When the policy makers formulate policies, they may be 
assumed to account properly for influence of policy choices on the private agents' 
expectations. In the REH model, expectations about endogenous variables, Y^, reflect 
proper account for the private sector's expectations about government's policy rules. 
In a well known linear-quadratic optimization problem, applying optimal control 
techniques to the policy makers is equivalent to solving one-person dynamic game to 
72 
find the optimal strategy of the dominant player.^^ By redefining as a result of 
responses of the private sector to the government's policy choices, the linear 
constraint (4.1) and (4.4) become a decision environment for the government authorities 
who want to minimize their loss function, say, (5.1). Under assumption of hierarchical 
information structure, the government sector is a dominant player and the private 
sector is a follower. Examples of such game are the macroeconomic policy games 
studied by Kydland and Prescott (1977), Taylor (1979), Chow (1981, ch. 15), Barro and 
Gordon (1983), etc., monetary policy game studied by Canzoneri (1985) and Canzoneri 
and Gary (1985), the resource extraction game of Hansen, Epple, and Roberds (1985), 
and duopoly noncooperative dynamic game of Kydland (1975). 
Expression (5.7) and (5.8) from the synthesis of the QEP and the REH, are 
relevant to the issue of existence of political business cycles. According to them, 
the public sector can generate business cycles by varying the levels of elements of Y* 
or or by varying relative size of components of G and H. 
^^Sargent (1986, ch. 1 and 2) described an economy as a dynamic game between 
the public and private sector. Each element of a collection of decision rules (h) of 
private agents is itself a function that maps some private agents information at time 
t into his decision at that time. Some elements in a collection of element(f) that 
forms the "environment" facing private agents represent rules of the game or decision 
rules selected by the government, which map the government's information at some 
date into its decision at  that date.  The elements of h are partly functions of f.  
The mapping h into f represents "cross-equation restrictions" since each element of h 
and f is itself a decision rule or equation determining the choices of some variables 
under agent's control. 
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VI. EMPIRICAL STUDY 
A. Taylor Model 
Some possible syntheses of the QEP and the REH that differed in the underlying 
assumptions have been discussed. For empirical study, this study employed Taylor's 
(1979) simple macroeconomic model. Taylor investigated an econometric method for 
selecting macroeconomic policy optimal rule under the REH. He estimated a simple 
macroeconometric model of the U.S. and used this estimated model, then, to derive 
optimal monetary policy rules to stabilize fluctuations in output and inflation. 
Taylor's structural model is 
^t = ^iVl + Vt-I + V"t - Pt> + V'^t-l - Pt-l) + Vt + V + bo + U; 
(6.1) 
't-'t-l + 'lV'0 + \ (62) 
"t = "t • "iVl (6 3) 
^ = «t-Vt-1 (6 4) 
where y^ is the log real expenditures measured as a deviation from trend, m^ is the 
log of money balances during period t, p^ is the log aggregated price level prevailing 
during period t, tc^ is the rate of inflation defined as p^^j - p^, y^ and are the 
conditional expectations of y^ and tt^, respectively, given information through period 
t-1, and n^ and e^ are random shocks to the output and inflation equations. The 
random vector (n^, e^) is assumed to be serially uncorrelated with mean zero and 
variance-covariance matrix M. Since the output equation, (6.1), includes two lagged 
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dependent variables, there exist very little identifiable serial correlation in the 
error term u^. However, the presence of real money balances in this equation suggests 
that the lagged shock from the price equation will change real balances in equation 
(6.1) as much as recurrent shock. But the first type of shock will have a much 
smaller effect on aggregated demand. 
A A 
Since (6.1) and (6.2) include unobservable y^ and it is required to take 
conditional expectations both sides of (6.1) and (6.2), given information through 
period t-1, then 
^t = •'l^t-l + Vt-2 + ^3(™t - Pt) + Wl - Pt-P + b5"t + ''6^ + ("O 
- ^iVl (6 5) 
\ = \-l + 'l^t + 'O - %1 (6.6) 
Solving these equations for y^ and and substituting the solutions into (6.1) and 
(6.2) gives reduced form equation as follows: 
yt = a[bjy^_j + b^y^_^ + b^(mt " + V^t-l " Pt-1> + "s^-l + V 
+ bjrj + bg - (6.7) 
\ = ^Clt^iyt-l + Vt-2 +b3(mt "V + V^t-l - Pt-l)] + "t-1 + 'ibgt 
+ rjbo + rg - (r,q, + q^Je, ,) + e^ (6.8) 
where a = (1 - b^rp'^ 
It is should be noted that Taylor assumed that p^ is predetermined at time t in 
A A 
order to solve for y^ and jt^. Also he assumed that the money supply, m^, is 
predetermined: that the conditional expectation of m^ given information through time 
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period t-1 is equal to itself. 
To estimate parameters of reduced form equations, (6.7) and (6.8), which form a 
vector autoregressive moving-average (VARMA) model with restrictions on the 
parameters, Taylor employed the Minimum Distance Estimation (MDE) method. And 
then he used these estimates to find optimal feedback control rules for money supply 
which aim to reduce the fluctuations of real output and inflation about average target 
levels. 
For this purpose, Taylor assumed a quadratic preference function of the 
government as 
where y* and ir* represent target levels for output and inflation, represents 
conditional expectations formed at period t-1, and 0 <_ A ^ 1. He focused on finding 
monetary feedback control rules to minimize the expected value of this loss function 
for the steady state stationary distribution of y^ and tt^. This is equivalent to 
finding a feedback rule to minimize the expected value of an undiscounted sum of such 
losses over an infinite time horizon. 
Taylor's optimal monetary feedback rule is 
= Eq E (1/2)1 A (y^ - y*)2 + (i_ A)(f^ - tt*)^] (6.8) 
^t ®lVl ^3^t-l Vl ®5®t-l (6.9) 
where d^ = m^ - p^ - hjt - h^ (for the definition of hj and h^, see Taylor, 1979, p. 
1277-78). Under the assumption of time invariant parameters, he employed optimal 
control techniques developed by Chow (1975, p. 170). 
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Taylor used aggregated U.S. data over the period from 1953:1 through 1975:IV. 
The particular series used for y^, m^, and p^ are the deviations of the log of real GNP 
from the log of potential GNP, the log of Mj, and the log of the GNP deflator, 
respectively, and all datum are seasonally adjusted. Taylor assumed the desired 
target values are given as follows: A logical target for y^ is the nonaccelerating 
inflation level of y^ given by the estimated values of equation (6.2). A target 
level for inflation would involve a welfare analysis which considers the benefits and 
costs of alternative average levels of inflation. In order to focus on the 
stabilization problem, Taylor assumed that such an analysis had been completed and 
that the optimal target rate of inflation was derived. There are several ways to 
determine the desired target level: Theil and Kloek (1960) used predicted values and 
Chow (1975) suggested using time path of index. 
B. Estimation 
1. Data 
This study will use both annual data and adjusted quarterly data for all the 
variables for the sample period of 1954 - 1985. Barro and Rush (1980) made 
comparisons of annual and quarterly results for the effect of U.S. monetary policy on 
money growth, unemployment, output, and price. They found that there exist a close 
correspondence in the results for the money growth, unemployment, and output 
equations, but not for the price equation. For the price equation, a discrepancy 
between the annual and quarterly estimates was caused by the introduction of 
adjustment for serial correlation of residuals for the quarterly data. This 
introduction drastically altered the quarterly coefficient estimates. 
The values of will be detrended for steady state stationary distribution of y^ 
instead of employing the deviation of the log of real GNP from the log of potential 
GNP as Taylor did. The value of is the log of implicit deflator of GNP derived by 
dividing the current dollar GNP (or component) by the constant dollar GNP (or 
component) and indexing these values on the base year of 1972. By the definition of 
1"^. ^t steady state stationary distribution. The value of m^ 
is the log of Ml. The data sources for the variables are the Survey of Current 
Business (July edition) and the Business Statistics. 1984. published by the United 
State Department of Commerce. 
The desired values for the y. will be replaced with (y^ ,)(l+;r ,) by assuming 
government try to maintain at least same level of y. , in real term and the desired 
I- 1 
value of JT^ will be replaced with the lowest inflation rate of any quarter in the 
previous year for both yearly data and quarterly data. The desired target value for 
m^ will be replaced with the predicted trend of m^ in both yearly and quarterly 
analyses. 
2. Possible svnthesis and estimation 
For estimation of the rational expectations model, since the structural 
parameters are usually unknown, the expectations will not be observable and thus it 
will be necessary to substitute the restricted reduced form equations for the 
rationally expected variables. Typically, the restricted reduced form will be 
nonlinear function of the unknown structural parameters.^^ 
2^In the case of unrestricted reduced form equations, if forecasts of exogenous 
variables are observable, then the forecasts can be treated as predetermined variables 
and a standard estimation method can be used. However, if the model contains 
expected endogenous variables, then the forecasts will not, in general, be rational as 
the forecasts fail to take into account all of the a priori information in the system 
As mentioned already, this study has an interest in comparing various syntheses 
of the QEP and the REH with both annually data and quarterly data. Under the 
assumption that the monetary authority try to derive both yearly and quarterly optimal 
money supply rule, they may use realized disturbance terms of the previous quarters, in 
the quarterly analysis, as partial information for the disturbance term in the yearly 
analysis. However, for the quarterly data, the assumption D2 is unrealistic assumption. 
Therefore, there are eight possible synthesis for the annual analysis and four possible 
synthesis for the quarterly analysis. 
To derive optimal decision rules according to the possible synthesis, it is 
required to know the values of the parameters of the relevant economic model. One 
way to derive optimal money supply rules, in the Taylor's model, is to regress 
equation (5.6), (5.12), and (5.13) according to the possible synthesis, as an one step 
procedure for optimal control rules, where parameters on the government preference 
function are incorporated. However, parameters on these equations are nonlinear and 
combinations of the structural parameters are very complicate. So it is required 
difficult restrictions on the parameters to obtain unique estimates of the structural 
parameters, which values are used to derive optimal decision rules. The other method 
is, as a two step procedure for optimal control rule, to regress reduced form 
equation (5.2) or (4.4) and then to derive optimal control rules for the policy 
variables which are function of parameters on the preference function and on the 
constraint and of the variables of the constraint by applying known parameters from 
the first step estimation procedure to the optimal money supply rules, (5.7), (5.12), 
or (5.13), according the possible synthesis. This second method is more convenient 
than the one step method because the combinations of the parameters on (5.2) are not 
and, as a result, the estimates will not be fully efficient (Wickens, 1982). 
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as complicated as those of (5.7), (5.12), and (5.13). Regression (5.2), that is, (6.7) 
and (6.8) in Taylor model, is a kind of limited information estimation procedure since 
regression of only (5.2) ignores information about the preference function, but this 
method may guarantee asymptotically consistent estimates. Thus this study will employ 
the second method. 
Basically, estimation procedure for (5.2) depends on the underlying assumption of 
the synthesis and the time period of data employed. For example, under the 
assumption Al, where prediction of price level and money supply level in Taylor model 
are treated as predetermined, the estimable equation are (6.7) and (6.8). While under 
the A2, where the prediction of price level is treated as predetermined but prediction 
of money supply level is followed ARMA process, the estimable equation will be (6.7) 
A A 
and (6.8) with replacing m^ by f ^m^ ^, where f ^ represent estimator of f^. 
When we analyze annual money supply rules along with quarterly rules, we may 
obtain partial information on in annual analysis from realized residuals in quarterly 
analysis. Thus in annual analysis can be expressed as a function of realized 
quarterly residuals as 
A A A 
where u^^ represent realized errors in quarterly analysis, n^ and e^ in (6.7) and 
(6.8), and s^ is residuals with mean zero and variance V and is assumed serially 
uncorrelated. However, for convenience, in annual analysis may be replaced with 
average realized residuals in previous four quarters by letting s^ = 0. In this study, 
we assume that yearly money supply rules is determined at the beginning of the year 
and then is replaced with average realized errors in four quarters of previous year. 
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A 
If policy rules is made at, say, August, 1, then u^^ is average realized residuals from 
the third quarter in previous year to the second quarter in current year. 
3. Estimation procedure 
As mentioned earlier, estimation procedure depend on the basic assumption for the 
possible synthesis. So this section will discuss the estimation procedure for (6.7) 
and (6.8) system as a proxy for estimation of (5.7), (5.12), and (5.13). Equation 
system (6.7) and (6.8) is a vector autoregressive moving average (VARMA) nonlinear in 
parameters. Because of lack of computer routines for nonlinear VARMA^^, this study 
will employ standard nonlinear estimation procedure by modifying Taylor's MA 
assumption of the stochastic structure of the random shocks, (6.3) and (6.4) to 
autoregressive (AR) disturbance — Model 1 — and to no transitory cross random shock 
-- Model 2. 
a. Model 1 The first modified assumption of the MA error structure is AR 
disturbance structure as follows: 
"t = qiVi^"t 
^t = ^2Vl + ®t 
(6.12) 
(6.13) 
where E[n e ] 0 with variance-covariance matrix M, E[n n .] = E[e^e^ .] = 0 for all 
I I  t  t — 1  t  t — J  
i and j > 0, E[n^e^^j] = E[ejn^^.] = 0 for all i and j > 0, and E[e^] = E[nJ = 0. If 
we replace Taylor's assumption of MA error structure by an AR error structure, 
Taylor's underlying assumption an outside random shock in the inflation equation at 
^^Taylor used the Time Series Processor (TSP, version 2.7) computer routine. 
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time t-1 has transitory effect on output at time t still holds. Then, under this 
modified assumption, the estimable equations will be 
Vt = ^[^1^1-1 + Vt-2 + v^'t - Pt) + V'^t-i - Pt-p + Vt-1 + V 
+ b^rj + bg] + u^ (6.14) 
^ = ^("l^^l^t-l + Vt-2 +b3(m^ -Pj) + b4(m^_j - P,,,)] + + r,bgt 
+ r,bQ + TQ) + (6.15) 
Substituting (6.12) and (6.13) into (6.14) and (6.15), respectively, results 
yt = ^[("lyt-i + *^2^2 + - Pt) + Vvi - Pt-i) + ''5V1 + ^6* 
+ b^rj + bg] + QjVjj + n^ (6.16) 
^ + Vt-2 +^3("'t -Pt) + Wl - Pt-l)] + Vl + ^1V 
+ rjbp + Iq) + + e^ (6.17) 
From (6.15), 
Vl = Vl - ^{'•l[^V2 + Vt-3 +('3('"t-l - Pt-p + ^(•"t-2 - Pt-2)] 
V2 "^1^0 V (6.18) 
By the Koyck transformation procedure, multiplying (6.18) by and q^ and 
substituting these into (6.16) and (6.17), respectively, gives an estimable nonlinear 
equation system as follows:^^ 
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Vt = + (^2-')ri^i\-2 - q/iVt-3 + - Pt> 
+ (b^-q^r;b^)(m^_; - p^_,) - qir^b^(m^_2 " Pt-2)] + Vl 
- aqjTj.j + abg(l-qjrj)t + a(bgr^ + bg) + aqjCr^bQ+r^) + aq^r^b^ + n^ 
(6.19) 
Zj = a{rj[b,yj_j + (b^-Qzbpy^ ^ - q^b^y^.g + b^dn^ -p^ 
+ (b^-q^b^Xm^,] - P^.j) - q2b^(m^_2 - P^.g)]) + (abg + 
- ^Vt-2 + + (^-q2)("l^0 + V + ^^2'"l^6 + ®t 
(6.20) 
We should note that multicollinearity among time variables (t) and (t-1) and constant 
term has already been remedied by replacing (t-1) by (t)-l in the process of deriving 
equations (6.19) and (6.20). 
b. Model 2 The second modified assumption is qj = = 0 in (6.3) and (6.4) 
and where E[u v ] ^ 0 with variance-covariance matrix W, E[u.u^ .] = E[v v .] = 0 for 
I t  t  t - 1  t  t - J  
all i and j > 0, E[u^v^^j] = E[v^u^^.] = 0 for all i and j > 0, and E[u^] = E[v^] = 0. 
In this case the estimable equations are (6.14) and (6.15) themselves. 
By the assumption of the model, that is, n^ and e^ and u^ and v^ are serially 
uncorrelated with mean zeros and variance-covariance M and W, respectively, we may 
employ the Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) method for nonlinear equation system 
and the SAS/ETS computer routine is available for this nonlinear SUR. Appendix A 
and B present details on estimation procedure for the nonlinear model and nonlinear 
SUR method, respectively. 
^^For justification of this procedures, see Johnston (1972, pp. 316-318). 
83 
4. Empirical results 
Since this study employed Taylor's assumption about prediction of the implicit 
real GNP deflators, we need to discuss results of prediction of the money supply. Ml. 
According to the REH.l, the quarterly and annual money supply are predicted using 
following equations, respectively. 
and 
ni = -.052 + 1.012m , 
^ (-6.7) (713.3r^ (6.21) 
m, = -.214 + 1.049m , 
^ (-6.2) (165.8) (6.22) 
where values in the parentheses are t-ratio under the null hypothesis that the 
parameter = 0. 
The parameter estimators are reported in table 1 for the modified model 1 and 2 
in 1954-1985 and for the Taylor model in 1953-1975 for comparison of the results. As 
can be seen, the estimators, in Taylor model, are significantly different from zero 
except the estimates of expected inflation rate in production equation in terms of t-
ratio. However, the model 1 and 2 show some estimates are not significantly different 
from zero. These differences could stem from following sources; (i) Different sample 
period; Taylor used seasonally adjusted quarterly data for 1953-1 to 1975-IV and the 
modified models employed seasonally adjusted quarterly data and annual data for 1954-
I to 1985-IV. Thus it might said that the differences of the estimates between Taylor 
model and modified models could represent structural changes in the U.S. economy over 
different sample period, (ii) Different data source; Taylor's estimators based on the 
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National Bureau Economic Research (NBER) data base, but results of estimation of this 
study depend on the Department of Commerce data base, (iii) Different data; Taylor 
used deviations of log real GNP from log of potential GNP series which is revised 
estimate of the Council of Economic Advisers but this study detrended log real GNP by 
deviating actual log real GNP from the trend of log real GNP. (iv) Different 
assumption about error structure; Taylor assume MA process of disturbances but this 
study assume AR disturbance structure in the modified model 1 and no cross 
intertemporal relations of errors in the modified model 2. (v) Different estimation 
method and computer routine; Taylor used the minimum distance estimation method with 
the time series processor as a computer routine but this study employed nonlinear 
ordinary least squares and seeming unrelated regression method with SAS/ETS. Among 
above five sources, the first and the fourth sources may be main sources of the 
differences between estimators of the Taylor model and the modified models. 
The estimates of bj and ^2 of all the modified models are significantly different 
from zero. The lagged values of y^, y^ j and y^ can show the magnitude of the 
multiplier-accelerator effect. Since the absolute value of b^ is smaller than that of 
bj, we can rewrite, as an example, the quarterly modified model 1. under the REH.l, 
l.llly^ j - .121y^_2 •99yj_j + .121(y^_j - y^ ^) then this represents the magnitude 
of the acceleration component which is added to the first-order autoregression. 
Including lagged real money balances represent partial adjustment of these 
balances to changes in interest rates and income. Thus it is expected b^ and b^ have 
opposite signs and b^ is smaller than b^ in absolute value. Taylor's results satisfy 
these expectations. The modified models show that the signs of b^ are opposite to 
signs of b^ except quarterly modified model 2 under the REH.2 but they are not 
significant. Some absolute magnitudes of b^ and b^ do not follow theoretical 
â b 
Table 1. Nonlinear estimates of the model ' 
Model 1 
Variable Parameter 
REH.2 REH.l REH.l REH.2 
Quart. Quart. Year Quart. 
1.167 1.111 1.157 1.105 
(13.3) (15.9) (10.5) (15.8) 
-.324 -.121 -.337 -.115 
(-3.6) (-1.7) (-3.9) (-1.7) 
.578 .038 .209 .021 
(3.3) (1.0) (1.9) (.6) 
-.484 -.045 -.491 -.027 
(-2.5) (-1.2) (-3.8) (-.7) 
-.447 .646 .486 .640 
(-1.4) (7.2) (2.4) (7.2) 
8.4(-5) 5.1(-6) 1.2(-3) 4.8(-6) 
(1.1) (.3) (2.6) (.3) 
.072 -.005 -3.445 -.006 
(2.1) (-.7) (-1.0) (-.8) 
.018 -.003 -.059 -.003 
(3.1) (-.8) (-.8) (-.8) 
.001 .002 -4.964 .002 
(3.0) (3.2) (-1.5) (3.2) 
.38 -.373 .734 -.371 
(-5.5) (2.1) (-5.4) 
-.67 -.50 All -.497 
(-6.3) (2.2) (-6.3) 
Output equation 
Vi h 
yt-2 ^2 
mt-Pt b3 
•"t-l-Pt-l ^4 
(t) bg 
(^0 
Inf^tion equation 
^t 'l 
> '0 
Error structure 
Vi ^1 
Vl ^2 
^Parentheses under estimators indicate t-statistic of the estimator. 
Parentheses after estimates represent multiplication of minus powers of 10, 
for example 8.4(-5) = .000084. 
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Model 2 
REH.2 REH.l REH.l REH.2 REH.2 
Year Quart. Year Quart. Year 
1.064 
(6.8) 
-.264 
(-1.8) 
-.463 
(-2.5) 
.326 
(1.6) 
.49 
(2.5) 
9.1(-4) 
(1.9) 
.634 
(.5) 
-.017 
(-.2) 
-3.556 
(-1.3) 
1.251 
(15.7) 
-.257 
(-3.2) 
.035 
(1.0) 
-.029 
(-.8) 
.60 
(8.7) 
-2.4(-5) 
(-1.4) 
-.011 
(-1.7) 
-.589 
(-.7) 
.002 
(1.2) 
1.204 
(13.4) 
-.362 
(-4.2) 
.100 
(1.2) 
-.038 
(-3.9) 
.738 
(4.3) 
5.5(-4) 
(1.2) 
-.089 
(-.2) 
-.006 
(-1.6) 
-1.086 
(-1.2) 
1.254 
(15.8) 
-.259 
(-3.7) 
.003 
(.1) 
.007 
(.2) 
.558 
(8.1) 
-2.2(-5) 
(-1.2) 
-.014 
(-1.8) 
-.006 
(-.7) 
.001 
(1.0) 
.994 
(12.1) 
-.142 
(-1.8) 
-.432 
(-4.0) 
.169 
(1.4) 
.809 
(4.6) 
1.6(-4) 
(.4) 
.108 
(.5) 
-.049 
(-1.4) 
-.311 
(-.4) 
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expectations while Taylor's results do. 
The coefficient of the expected inflation rate is positive and very significant 
in all the modified models as we expected, that is, a higher expected future price of 
goods relative to current goods should stimulate production. This could allow 
existence of short run Phillips curve. These positive signs could show that 
substitution effect of a higher expected future price level dominate income effect. 
While Taylor's estimates show that the coefficient b^ is negative and has small t 
value so that this allow existence of long run vertical Phillips curve. 
In the inflation equation, the coefficient of expected output variable show 
negative signs but have small t ratios in the modified models except yearly modified 
model 2 under REH.l. These results could say existence of long run vertical Philips 
curve. However, Taylor's result is matched with the assumption of accelerationist 
regardless sticky or flexible prices, that is output can be increased permanently 
above its secular trend growth rate with accelerating rates of inflation. The 
intercept term in the inflation equation has an economic meaning. Other words, the 
zero change of inflation rate may not occur where output equals its estimated secular 
trend. Most results of the modified models show that estimated coefficients of 
intercept term in inflation equation are not significant and some of them are positive 
and some are negative. But Taylor's estimate is positive and significantly different 
from zero which means that inflation will be stimulated when the economy is operating 
at the estimated secular trend. 
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C. Optimal Money Supply Rules 
For comparison of the syntheses of REH and QEP, this study focuses on different 
assumptions about predictions by the private sector of the endogenized policy 
variables, in alternatives A1 and A2, and inclusion or exclusion of the policy 
variables in the preference function, in alternatives B1 and B2. Taylor's synthesis 
of the QEP and the REH is the combination of Al-Bl-Cl-Dl-El. This study 
investigate other combination of assumptions with special attention to A2 and B2. 
From the numerical comparison of the syntheses, it is expected that we could find 
numerical differences resulting from differences in underlying assumptions and 
conclusions. As mentioned earlier, solutions for at any single time period, C2, 
might not be the same as optimal solutions for multi-period, under CI. Since this 
study employs Taylor's simple macroeconomic model, there is no difference between El 
and E2. However, we recognize that some underlying assumptions of the QEP and the 
REH are irrelevant in some syntheses. For example, assumption D2 may not be applied 
to quarterly analysis and assumption Bl, excluding endogenized policy instruments in 
the objective function may result in a nonunique solution. Therefore the total number 
of possible synthesis varies according to situations. 
Like estimation procedure for the reduced form equation system, the optimal 
money supply rules depend also on the basic assumptions and the policy decision 
making term. To derive optimal policy rules for the single period, rewrite Taylor's 
equation system (6.1) through (6.4) to match the notation of (4.1) as follows: 
BY^ + A^ + PjXj^ + + Pg^St = ^t (6.23) 
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where 
Yj = [y^, ^j]', ^ = [Yj, Tj]', 
= [^t-r V2' '"t-rPt-r Vr Vi^' 
= tVi' yt-2' ""t-rPt-r Vi^' 2' 
Uj = [n^, ej. X2t = [t, 1]', 
B  =  -  r i  0  
0 1 
Xjt = [m^-p^l, 
A = - r 0 bgl 
L^l 0 
Pl = - bj b^ b^ 0 qjl 
0 0 0 1 
^ 2 = - ^0 (^61 
0 r„ 
P3 = - [b3 or 
To derive optimal money supply rules it is necessary to specify the desired target 
values of and and the weight matrixes G and H. The desired goal for y^ is 
assumed to be (y^_j)(l+n'^_^), that is government's goal on y^ is to at least maintain 
same level of y^ in real terms. For example, y* for 1986-1 and 1986 turn out to be 
4,123 billion dollars and 4,211.8 billion dollars, respectively. The tt* is assumed to 
be the lowest inflation rate in any quarter during the previous calendar year and its 
value, for example, is 1.48 for 1986-1 and 5.92 for 1986. The goal value for money 
supply, m*, is replaced with the predicted value by equation (6.21) for the quarterly 
analysis and by equation (6.22) for the annual analysis with the corresponding values 
for 1986-1 being 634.0 billion dollars and for 1986 being 631.0 billion dollars, 
respectively. The weight matrixes G and H are assumed to be G = [.5 0 / 0 .5] and H 
= [1], where symbol / represent separation of rows in the matrix. 
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1. Quarterly policy rules 
For the quarterly optimal money supply rules, the D2 is unrealistic assumption, 
so the possible combination of the underlying assumptions, the optimal money supply 
rules according to the assumptions, and intermediate calculating procedures of the 
models are summarized as follows, where M = B"^A[B+A]"\ Q = 
D = [H + Pj'B"^ GB"^?^]"'' K = [P3'(M-B"^)'G(M-B" and F = [H + 
Pg'CM-B" ^  )'G(M-B'^ )P3r ^  
(1) AI-B1-C2-D1-E1; 
= KPjXM-B'S'GY* 
- KP3'(M-B"b'G(M-B"^(PjXj^ + P^X^^) (6.24) 
= [26.229, -.797][Y*] - [.000135, -.0914][X^^] 
- [29.084, -3.167, -1.178, 16.831, -16.83][Xj^] (model 1) 
[28.92, -.173][Y*] - [-.00007, -.00568][X2j] 
- [36.05, -7.406, -.836, 16.974][X^^] (model 2) 
(2) A1-B2-C2-D1-E1; 
X^ = FP3'(M-B"S'GY* + FHX*^ 
- FP3'(M-B"')'G(M-B"^(PJXjj + P^X^^) (6.25) 
= [.999][X*^] + [.019, -5.8(10"'*)][Yp - [9.77(10'^), 6.64(10"'')][X2j] 
- [.0211, -.0023, -.000856, .0122, -.0132][X^^] (model 1) 
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= [.999][X*j] + [.0173, -.000104][Y*] - [-4.2(10"®), -3.4(10"^)][X2j] 
- [.0215, -.00442, -.0005, .0101][Xj^] (model 2) 
(3) A2-B1-C2-D1-E1; 
X^ = - QPj-B'^'GY* + QP3'B"''G(M-B"^)(PJXjj + P^X^^) 
+ QPj'B'^'GMP^fjXj^j (6.26) 
= - [-46.95, 0][Y*] + [.00192][f^X^^_^] + [2.26(10"'*), .214][X2j] 
+ [-51.779, 5.389, 1.265, -29.989, 32.379][X^J (model 1) 
= - [369.0, 0][Y*] + [.0032][fgX^^_^] + [.000743 4.688][X2^] 
+ [-461.24, 95.264, -2.354, -205.24][X^^] (model 2) 
(4) A2-B2-C2-D1-E1; 
X^ = DHX*^ - DP^-B'^GY* + DP^-B"^ G(M-B"^(PjXjj + P^X^^) 
+ DPj-B'^GMP^fjX^jj (6.27) 
= [.999][X*j] - [-.0106, 0][Y*] + [4.346(10-'^)][f^X^^_^] 
+ [-.0117, .00122, .000287, -.0068, .00734][X^^] 
+ [-5.12(10"\ 4.86(10"'*)][Xj^] (model 1) 
= [•999][X*j] - [.00136, 0][Yp + [1.185(10-®)][f^X^^ 
+ [-.00169, .00035, -8.6(10"^), -.000754][Xj^] 
+ [2.73( 10"^), 1.72( 10"'*)][X2j] (model 2) 
Table 2. Optimal money supplies for 1981-1 to 1986-1 (billion $ in real terms) 
(Values in parentheses represent actual money supply in each quarter) 
Synthesis Model 1981-1 
(223.11) 
1981-11 
(225.47) 
1981-III 
(220.25) 
198I-IV 
(220.9) 
A1-B1-C2-•D1 -El model 1 3952.93 3098.83 3201.53 4068.23 
model 2 3756.74 2911.35 3039.82 3915.06 
A1-B2-C2-•D1 -El model 1 224.84 227.5 215.67 217.63 
model 2 223.97 227.51 214.51 217.63 
A2-B1-C2--D1 -El model 1 7104.34 7777.02 5755.66 7305.76 
model 2 46659.1 52116.1 37409.3 48572.8 
A2-B2-C2--D1 -El model 1 223.13 226.55 214.18 216.72 
model 2 221.58 224.77 213.43 214.85 
Model 1982-1 1982-11 1982-III 1982-IV 1983-1 1983-11 
(223.55) (225.9) (220.76) (228.95) (236.1) (240.52) 
model 1 4220.99 2853.65 3245.88 2396.33 2469.8 3286.12 
model 2 4092.5 2637.84 3102.96 2133.22 2273.12 3196.94 
model 1 223.25 216.48 214.94 217.27 226.93 235.17 
model 2 222.9 216.27 214.81 217.38 226.7 234.9 
model 1 7542.54 5123.3 5824.07 4302.28 4427.02 5891.4 
model 2 50812.7 32140.9 38079.8 25613.5 27389.5 39212.5 
model 1 221.97 218.62 214.04 216.63 226.19 234.17 
model 2 219.99 214.2 212.37 215.41 225.41 232.93 
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Synthesis Model 1983-III 
(243.22) 
1983-IV 
(245.58) 
1984-1 
(244.41) 
1984-11 
(246.53) 
A1-B1-C2-D1-E1 model 1 2219.53 2477.68 3121.32 4347.68 
model 2 2002.49 2268.9 2932.72 4052.59 
A1-B2-C2-D1-E1 model 1 227.32 234.21 236.81 241.48 
model 2 227.11 233.95 236.7 241.16 
A2-B1-C2-D1-E1 model 1 3979.36 4443.38 5600.65 7818.39 
model 2 23878.3 27265.1 35734.3 50003.8 
A2-B2-C2-D1-E1 model 1 226.66 233.44 235.89 240.24 
model 2 226.06 235.83 234.99 236.63 
Model 1984-III 
(246.21) 
1984-IV 
(247.12) 
1985-1 
(249.8) 
1985-11 
(257.04) 
1985-III 1985-IV 1986-1 
(263.75) (266.74) 
model 1 2939.73 3148.66 2561.48 4062.49 2591.34 3057.95 3101.15 
model 2 2961.11 2969.87 2345.67 780.41 3048.53 2905.'52 2937.57 
model 1 248.34 237.44 236.37 240.24 246.55 259.3 274.13 
model 2 248.38 237.37 236.21 238.07 246.79 259.15 273.96 
model 1 5257.72 5648.04 4631.91 7316.99 4684.58 5518.96 5597.05 
model 2 36080.6 36126.9 27799.4 7708.5 36779.4 34867.0 35245.3 
model 1 247.54 236.61 235.62 238.97 245.77 258.5 273.2 
model 2 246.45 235.62 233.39 237.56 245.41 258.16 272.98 
The empirical results for the period of 1981-1 to 1986-1 are summarized in Table 
2. To test theoretical synthesis of QEP and REH, this study derived twenty one 
quarterly optimal money supplies in real terms for 1981-1 to 1986-1. The optimal 
money supplies for each quarter represent optimal decisions of the Federal Resreve 
Board at the beginning of each quarter based on economic performance in previous 
quarters. As can be seen, when the endogenized policy variables, are excluded 
from the preference function under assumption Bl, the derived quarterly money supply 
rules are optimal but not acceptable solutions because they are much too large 
compared to actually realized money supplies in real terms. Whereas, when the policy 
instruments are included in the objective function under B2, the optimal money 
supplies are quite acceptable because they are close to actual values. They are 
assumed to be a unique solution for 1981-1 to 1986-1. 
Let us consider only acceptable money supply rules, that is those from assumption 
B2. Deviations of actual money supplies from optimal supplies are relatively small 
during 1981-I to 1982-1 with range of 0.02 to 6 billion dollars compare to deviations 
during 1982-III to 1985-IV which range from 0.2 to 18.3 billion dollars in real terms. 
Especially realized money supplies are very close to the optimal rules in 1981-1, 1981-
II, 1982-1, and 1984-III. Quarterly optimal money supplies, generally, are smaller 
than actually realized money supplies during the whole period of 1981-1 to 1985-IV 
except for 1981-1, 1981-11, and 1984-III. The results imply that if the government has 
exact preference function as (5.1) and faces constraints as (6.1) through (6.4), then 
the government, the Federal Resreve Board, over-supplied money by 5.44 billion dollars 
in 1985-IV under assumptions of A1-B2-C2-D1-E1 and of the model 1. This suggest 
that the Federal Reserve Board should have tightened money markets to achieve 
government's goals during 1981-1 to 1985-IV. There are small differences in optimal 
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money supplies between assumption A1 and A2 under the models 1 and 2, that is, there 
are only small differences between the results for REH.l and REH.2. Also there exist 
small differences in optimal money supply rules between different assumptions of error 
structure, the models 1 and 2, if we consider only acceptable money supply rules. 
Assumption B1 shows large deviations of actual money supplies from optimal rules. 
2. Annual policy rules 
We recognize that the U.S. monetary policy rule is determined biweekly or 
monthly rather than quarterly or yearly. So deriving optimal annual money supply 
rules may have no attraction if we have interests only in short-term government 
behavior. However, if we analyze any economic behavior which is related to 
government money supply over on periods, we need information on quarterly or yearly 
money supply rules. Other words, we need average annual money supply rules as 
guideline for yearly decision making. For example, a firm owner who makes yearly 
wage contracts with employees may need information on annual money supply. Also, if 
we have interests in annual beef consumption, even though beef purchases occur daily 
or weekly, we need annual money supply rules if we believe that beef consumption is 
eventually related to money supply. Therefore, period of money supply rules depend on 
nature of economic behavior and purpose of economic analysis. 
By employing the assumption (6.23), that is for the current term, policy maker 
could use partial information on the realized quarterly residuals from the quarterly 
policy rules, so in (6.23) can be replaced with = [n^j, e^j]'. The eight optimal 
money supply rules for possible syntheses and intermediate calculating steps are 
summarized as follows: 
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(5) A1-B1-C2-D1-E1; 
= KP3'(M-B"^)'GY* 
- KP3'(M-B"^)'G(M-B"^)(PjXJ^ + P2X2P (6.28) 
= [4.904, -.288][Y*] - [.00579, -6.372][X2j] 
- [5.536, -1.612, 2.349, 2.037, 4.484][Xj^] (model 1) 
= [10.357, .61][Yp - [.000546, -8.208][X2^] 
- [11.992, -3.606, -3.825, 6.74][X^J (model 2) 
(6) A1-B2-C2-D1-E1; 
X^ = FP^XM-B'S'GY* + FHX*^ 
- FP3'(M-B"b'G(M-B"^)(PjXj^ + (6.29) 
= [.98][X*j] + [.0995, -.00585][Yp - [.000117, -.129][X2^] 
- [.132, -.0327, .00476, .0414, .091][X^^] (model 1) 
= [.936][X*^] + [-.172, .0101][Y;^] - [-9.1(10"\ .137][X2^] 
- [-.259, .06, .0636, -.112][X^^] (model 2) 
(7) A2-B1-C2-D1-E1; 
X^ = - QPj-B'^'GY* + QP3'B"''G(M-B"^(PjXJ^ + P2X2^) 
+ QPj'B'^'GMPjfgX^^j (6.30) 
= - [.0002, -2.347][Yp + [.0084][f3X3j_ j] + [.0002, -2.374][X2j] 
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+ [2.279, -.565, .698, 1.049, .172][Xj^] (model 1) 
= - [2.315, 0][Y*] + [.0382][f^Xg^ + [.000356, -.32][X2^] 
+ [2.213, -.316, .376, 1.8][Xj^] (model 2) 
(8) A2-B2-C2-D1-E1; 
X^ = DHX*^ - DPj'B"^ GY* + DPg'B"^'G(M-B"^)(P^X^^ + P^X^^) 
* DPj-B-'GMPjfjXjj.j (6.31) 
= [.903][X*J - [.209, 0][Yp + [.000814][f3X3^ ^] 
+ [.296, -.0547, .0676, .102, .0167][Xj^] 
+ [1.9(10A -.23)][Xj^] (model 1) 
= [.915][X*^] - [.198, 0][Y*] + [.00326][f3X3^_j] 
+ [.257, -.027, .0321, .154][X^^] 
+ [3.04(10"\ -.0273][X2j] (model 2) 
(9) A1-BI-C2-D2-E1; 
= KP3'(M-B"S'GY» - KP3'(M-B"')'G(M-B"^(PjXj^ + P^X^^) 
- KP3'(M-B"S'GB"'UJ (6.32) 
= [4.904, -.288][Y*] - [.00579, -6.372][X2j] 
- [5.536, -1.612, 2.349, 2.037, 4.484][Xj^] 
- [4.904, -.288][L^] (model 1) 
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= [10.357, -.61][Y*] - [.000546, -8.208][X2^] 
- [11.992, -3.606, -3.852, 6.741][Xj^ 
[10.357, -0.61][Uj] (model 2) 
(10) A1-B2-C2-D2-E1; 
.5 
= FP^'(M-B"S'GY* + FHX*J - FP^'(M-B"^)'G(M-B"^)(P^X^ + P^X^^) 
- FP3'(M-B"^'GB"^U^ (6.33) 
[.98][X*^] + [.0995, -.00585][Y*] - [.000117, -.129][X2j] 
[.132, -.0327, .00476, .0414, .091][Xj^] 
[.0995, -.00585][L[] (model 1) 
-6. 
= [.936][X*J + [-.172, .0101][Y*] - [-9.1(10""), .137][X2j] 
[-.259, .06, .0636, -.112][X^J 
[.0479, -0.028][Uj] (model 2) 
(11) A2-B1-C2-D2-E1; 
X^ = - QPg-B'^'GY* + QP3'B"^'G(M-B"^)(PJXjj + PgX^^) 
+ QP^'B'^'GMPjfjX^jj + QP2'B"''GB"'U^ (6.34) 
- [.0002, -2.374][Y*] + [.0084][f3X3^_ j] + [.0002, -2.374][X2j] 
[2.279, -.565 
+ [ 232, 0][l{] 
+ , .698, 1.049, .172][X^J 
(model 1) 
= - [2.315, 0][Yp + [.0382][f3X3^_j] + [.000356, -.32][X^^] 
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+ [2.213, -.316, .376, 1.801][Xjj] 
+ [-.191, .0094][U^] (model 2) 
(12) A2-B2-C2-D2-E1; 
= DHX*^ - DPj'B"^ GY* + DP^'B"'G(M-B"^)(PjXj^ + P^X^^) 
+ DPj'B"^ GMPjfjX^j j + DPj'B'^'GB'^ÎI (6.35) 
= [.903][X*j] - [.209, 0][Y*] + [.000814][f 3X3^ ^] 
+ [.296, -.0547, .0676, .102, .0167][Xj^] 
+ [1.9(10A -.23)][Xjj] + [.209, 0][Uj] (model 1) 
= [.915][X*^] - [.198, 0][Y*] + [.00326][f3X3^_j] 
+ [.257, -.027, .0321, .154][Xj^] 
+ [3.04(10"®), -.0273][X2j] + [.198, 0][l|] (model 2) 
The optimal annual money supplies in real terms for 1981-1986 in Table 3 show 
again that excluding policy variables from the government objective function resulted 
in unacceptable rules because money supplies are either negative or too large compared 
to actually realized money supplies. The empirical results show no differences between 
results for D1 and D2 assumptions for both models under assumptions B1 and B2. 
Actually, the average error component of the model 2 for previous four quarters in 
1985, for example, under A1-B2-C2-D2-E1 and model 1 is -0.0003635 which can be 
disregarded. The combination of A1 and B2 yields nearly the same optimal money 
supplies as combination A2 and B2 under both models 1 and 2. 
Deviations of actual money supplies from optimal supplies in annual analysis of 
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Table 3. Optimal money supplies for 1981-1986^ (billion $ in real terms) 
Synthesis Model 1981 
(241.6) 
1982 
(235.1) 
1983 
(246.3) 
1984 
(253.5) 
1985 
(269.9) 
1986 
Ai--B1-C2-D1-E1 model 1 1852.9 3401.4 3948.1 5299.0 4309.4 4799.0 
model 2 3602.1 6049.6 7974.9 10809.1 8704.5 9729.9 
Al--B2-C2-D1-E1 model 1 198.0 207.8 207.5 273.2 241.8 294.8 
model 2 299.3 269.6 239.7 243.4 285.0 318.3 
A2--B1-C2-D1-E1 model 1 4890.1 5509.0 5913.0 6204.0 6638.4 6934.6 
model 2 -862.9 -1422.2 -2486.6 -2616.3 -2109.0 -2125.6 
A2--B2-C2-D1-E1 model 1 304.3 268.0 234.7 231.3 281.9 318.4 
model 2 297.1 261.1 231.7 232.5 280.0 318.8 
Al-•B1-C2-D2-E1 model 1 1852.9 3401.4 3948.1 5299.0 4309.4 4799.0 
model 2 3602.1 6049.6 7974.9 10809.1 8704.5 9729.9 
Al--B2-C2-D2-E1 model 1 198.0 207.8 207.5 273.2 241.8 294.8 
model 2 299.3 269.6 239.7 243.4 285.0 318.3 
A2-•B1-C2-D2-E1 model 1 4890.1 5509.0 5913.0 6204.0 6638.4 6934.6 
model 2 -862.9 -1422.2 -2486.6 -2616.3 -2109.0 -2125.6 
A2--B2-C2-D2-E1 model 1 304.3 268.0 234.7 231.3 281.9 318.4 
model 2 297.1 261.1 231.7 232.5 280.0 318.8 
^Values in parentheses represent actual money supply in each year. 
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the government's monetary policy behavior are relatively large during 1981-1985 with 
range of 5.44 to 57.64 billion dollars in real term compare to those in quarterly 
analysis. This fact implies that quarterly analysis of government behavior of 
monetary policy produces realistic money supply rules than do annual analyses under 
the assumption of B2. This also implies that errors of predicting government behavior 
are greater in annual analyses than in quarterly analyses. However, this does not 
necessary mean that the prediction errors of government behavior in the long run are 
larger than prediction errors in the short run, because each set of money supply rules 
is based on different data and estimated coefficients for the same model. From the 
empirical results we can justify including endogenized policy instruments in the 
preference function. Of course, optimal money supply rules we derived depend upon 
the assumption about values of H and G matrices and also desired target values of 
and 
D. Specification Errors 
This section investigates numerical specification errors according to Theil's 
definition discussed in previous chapter. The first specification error is due to 
difference between the reduced form equations (4.4) and (5.7) where (4.4) excludes 
relevant variables Y* and while (5.7) includes them. This difference stems from 
the fundamentally different assumption about policy instruments: exogenous policy 
variables vs endogenized policy variables. Since (5.7) was derived by substituting 
optimal solution of X^^, (5.6), into (5.2), we replace X^^ with X^ in (5.2). Thus 
the difference of (5.7) from (4.4) becomes 
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- X3P (6.36) 
for both REH.l and REH.2. This difference represent the specification errors of 
reduced form equation and these errors are equivalent to the differences between the 
predicted value of in (4.4) and in (5.7). 
The other specification error is the difference between rational expectations 
errors in (4.5) and in (5.8). Subtracting (5.8) from (4.5) results in (6.36). So we 
find that the specification errors of reduced form equations are just the same as the 
specification errors of the rational expectations and this fact comes from the 
definition of the rational expectations errors. 
The specification errors are summarized in Table 4 based on the possible 
syntheses and the modified models. The assumption B1 is excluded in procedures of 
deriving the specification errors because B1 assumption results in unacceptable 
solutions for optimal money supplies. As can be seen, there are no specification 
errors of inflation because this equation, (6.2), does not contain the m^ variable. 
The specification errors are much smaller in quarterly analysis than in yearly 
analysis. This fact may come from suggested inflationary annual monetary policy rules. 
There is no difference between specification errors under assumptions D1 and D2. This 
also come from fact that error components are close to zero. 
Table 4. Specification errors: exogenous vs endogenized 
Synthesis Model Specification errors on Y 
y^ (billion $ (index) 
in real terms) 
Quarterly analysis (1985-IV) 
A1-B2-C2-D1-E1 model 1 .284 0.0 
model 2 .263 0.0 
A2-B2-C2-D1-E1 model 1 .176 0.0 
model 2 .024 0.0 
Annual analysis (1985) 
A1-B2-C2-D1-E1 model 1 5.883 0.0 
model 2 -1.511 0.0 
A2-B2-C2-D1-E1 model 1 5.579 0.0 
model 2 4.342 0.0 
A1-B2-C2-D2-E1 model 1 5.883 0.0 
model 2 -1.511 0.0 
A2-B2-C2-D2-E1 model 1 5.579 0.0 
model 2 4.342 0.0 
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VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study had paid attention to endogenization of government policy instruments 
in contrast to treating them as exogenous. Modern governments, regardless of 
economic system and of stage of economic development, have the ability and the 
motivation to make major and detailed interventions, through economic policies, into 
the whole economy, from production to consumption. Every individual and/or group 
responds to the government policy choices. 
From the view point of political macroeconomics, we derive general conclusion 
that there is an interdependent relation between public sector and private sector. 
Government authorities achieve their purpose, say, maximizing popularity in order to 
be re-elected by manipulating policy variables. This claim justifies existence of 
political business cycle. In this context, government policy variables are no longer 
exogenous, rather they are endogenous variables. 
From the view point of political microeconomics, it is possible for us to assume 
that government regulates our economic life, and our feedback responses to the 
regulations could be revealed through election process. Various empirical studies try 
to estimate policy instrumental behavior equations and preference functions. Given 
the constructed preference functions and appropriate constraints, policy instruments 
or choice equations can be derived endogenously. Therefore, meaningful policy 
analysis allow a high degree of interdependence of microeconomic performance and 
microeconomic policy and justifies endogenizing government behavior. 
The flexible target model, in theory of the QEP, includes a social welfare function 
and reduced form equations as constraints policy makers face. The optimal policy rules 
can be expressed as a function of disturbance term so that variation in an error in a 
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constraint may cause optimal policy choice also to vary. Thus the policy instruments 
is not exogenous under specific assumptions. 
The theory of the REH verify relationship between public and private sectors. 
When policy makers choose policy rules, they form expectations on responses of the 
private sector to their choices and the private sector also form expectations on 
government's policy choices for economic decision. 
The synthesis of QEP and REH can be expressed as an optimal decision problem 
by assuming government authorities try to maximize their preference function with 
desired targets of economic variables under a certain decision environment which 
describes private sector's economic behavior. In the behavioral equations that 
describe the decision environment, private sector's expectations on policy choices 
can be included. When we focus on the government's optimal decision rules, this 
optimization process is a one-side policy game because as the policy makers formulate 
policies, they may take account properly of influences of the policy choices on the 
private sector's expectations. The one-side game we discussed is a nonrepeated game 
because we assumed government has a single period objective function and government 
wants to derive optimal policy rules for the one period. 
Recognition of the "policy filter" which assume a hierarchical information 
structure allows us to extend the one-side policy game to two-sided policy game. This 
policy game will be a dominant player policy game because the private sector can not 
recognize what goes on inside of the policy filter. This dissertation focused on 
single period policy rules. If we extend single period policy rules to multi-period 
policy rules, then the policy game will be repeated game. This two-sided repeated 
policy game might be a further research issue. 
The synthesis also allows us to revisit well known Lucas' critique of econometric 
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policy evaluation. When the private sector can not form proper expectations about 
policy choices (REH.l), in other words, when the private sector does not fully 
understand what goes on inside the policy filter, then Lucas' critique is not 
applicable because the private sector can not take proper account of changes in 
coefficients caused by changes in public policy. However, if the private sector forms 
proper expectations (REH.2), then Lucas' critique is valid. 
Generally, Taylor's empirical results of Taylor's economic model show more high t 
values than do results for the models 1 and 2. These differences mainly come from 
the different assumption about error structure, different sample periods, and 
different estimation methods. One important feature of the estimators in this study 
is opposite signs of coefficients of predicted inflation rate (b^) and output (r^). 
But these opposite signs can be explained on reasonable economic grounds. For 
example, the positive and highly significant b^ in this study shows existence of short 
run Phillips curve, that is higher expected future price results in higher production 
(or consumption). While negative and nonsignificant b^ in Taylor's study implies 
existence of long run vertical Phillips curve. A negative and nonsignificant tJ in 
this study represents a long run vertical Phillips curve while positive and significant 
Tj in Taylor's study support the accelerationist assumption that output can be increased 
with accelerating rate of inflation. 
In numerical comparisons of various syntheses of REH and QEP, it was found that 
exclusion of endogenized policy variables from the government's preference function 
resulted in solutions which are optimal and unique but not acceptable because money 
supplies are either negative or too large compared to actual money supplies. Thus it 
is claimed that the endogenous policy instruments should be included in government 
objective function. The combination of A1 and B2 yields nearly the same optimal 
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money supplies as combination A2 and B2 under both models 1 and 2. In contrast, 
optimal annual money supplies differed little between models 1 and 2 under combination 
A2 and B2, but they differed greatly between models 1 and 2 under combination A1 and 
B2. Deviations of actual money supplies in real term from optimal supplies in annual 
analysis are large compare to those in quarterly anlysis. 
We recognize that the optimal money supply rules depend on the assumption of 
desired target values of GNP and money supply and of weight matrixes G and H. As 
the values of goals and weight matrixes vary, the optimal policy rules also vary. 
This fact supports existence of politically motivated business cycle. 
According to Theil's definition, specification errors show what are the 
differences between assumption of exogenous policy choices and endogenous choices. 
We find that the rational expectations errors are same as the specification errors of 
exogeniety of endogenous policy variables. 
Possible syntheses of the QEP and the REH give us different money supply rules 
according to the underlying assumptions. As economists, we may find gaps between 
optimal policy rules suggested by economists and economic policies implemented by 
policy makers. Traditionally, the relation between economists and policy makers is 
considered as a one-way channel of communication. Economists send a menu of 
choice to the policy makers and policy makers then impose value judgments and make 
choices from the economists menu. However most people agree that economic policy is 
very far from a state of perfection. Behind this recognition of reality, there may be 
an unrealistic degree of certainty in the economists' economic knowledge. Also 
economists so often misunderstand the political process and the part the policy makers 
play in it. In fact, all text books of macro and microeconomics deal with an extremely 
naive view of the state. There may also be an unrealistic willingness on the part of 
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policy makers to leave technical judgement about the menu of choice to professional 
economists. Policy makers tend to be practical men and so often reject theorizing 
either on the grounds that all theories are unnecessary or irrelevant theories (Lipsey, 
1979). Implicitly, the government authorities may be disinterested in maximizing 
economic welfare as defined by economists. Therefore, relationship between policy 
makers and economists as economic advisers can be a further research issue if we have 
an interest in endogenized optimal policy decisions. 
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VIII. APPENDIX A; NONLINEAR REGRESSION 
A. Nonlinear Model and Parameter Estimation 
Let's assume we have a correct nonlinear model to be estimated for parameters, 
= f(Xj, 6*) + e^, t = 1, 2, T (A.l) 
and this set of equations can be written as a vector form 
Y = F((9) + e (A.2) 
where 
Y = (yj, y2» •••» y-p) 
m' = [f(Xj, e*), f(x2, 6*\ f(x^, 4*)] 
e = (Gj, 
and where y^ represents T observed dependent variables corresponding to nonstochastic 
k-dimentional exogenous variables x^, 6* is a p-dimentionalvector of unknown true 
parameters, and f(x^, 6*)  denotes response function which is nonlinear in parameters, 
and e^ is an unobservable disturbance term, assumed to be independently and identically 
2 distributed with mean zero and unknown true variance a* . The symbol * in B* 
represents true unknown parameter vector in the parameter space and 9 denotes any 
trial value of the parameter vector. 
The sum of squared deviations of the observed y^ from the predicted value f(x^, 
6) corresponding to a trial value of the parameter 6 is 
T 2 (A.3) 
ssE(g) = E [y,-f(x., e)r 
t=l 
and as a vector form 
SSE(g) = [Y - f(0)]'[Y - f(g)] (A.4) 
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The estimation procedure for the nonlinear model is to choose the vector Ô that 
minimizes (A.4). The least squares estimator, as an estimate for 6*, is a 
solution to the normal equations 
T 
[3SSE(e)/aôj I = -2 E [af/aOj | = o 
t=i 
T 
[3SSE((?)/aflp I 4^^] = -2 E [dr/ae^ \ = o 
(A.5) 
where [3SSE(ô)/3^p | 8] is the derivative of SSE(5), with respect to 9^, evaluated at 6 
and similarly for [df/dS^ \ 8], 
The nonlinear least squares (LS) estimator is, in general, not best linear 
unbiased estimator (BLUE). However, even if the error distribution is nonnormal, the 
nonlinear LS estimator, of 8* is consistent and asymptotically normally 
distributed if following three conditions are satisfied; (i) e^ is independently and 
2 identically distributed with mean zero and varince a* . (ii) f(x^, 6) is continuous 
in  bo th  and  9  and  i s  a t  l eas t  twice  con t inuous ly  d i f fe ren t i ab le  wi th  respec t  to  8.  
(iii) The sequence of x^ is such that it is bounded and well behaved in a certain sense 
as T approaches to infinity to guarantee the invertibility [Z(Ô*)'Z(Ô*)], which will be 
discussed later. 
The consistency of the LS estimator implies that, given a large sample, the 
estimates is likely to be close to the true parameter 8*. The LS nonlinear estimation 
procedure approximates f(Xj, 9) in 8* by the linear term of the Taylor series 
expansion, which is the best linear approximation. 
Let us take a Taylor series expansion for (A.l), 
I l l  
f(x., 9) « f(x., 6*) + S [5f(x e)/d9. I 6*][6 -  6*] 
^ ^ i=l ^ 
(A.6) 
Note that 
[af(x^, g)/6W, 1 6*], [af(x^. 6)/d6^ I 6*] 
is the t-th row of Z(d*) where Z{6*) is the (Txp) Hessian matrix of f(x^, 6), that is 
Z{e*) = 
[af(Xj, 9)/de^ I 6*1 ..., [3f(x^, 6)/dB 1 e*] 
[3f(x^. e)/d9^ I 6*],..., [af(x.j., 9)/a9 | 9*]  _ 
(A.7) 
Thus (A.6) can be written as 
f(x, 9) « f(x, 9*) + Z{9*X9 - 9*) 
Substituting the RHS of (A.8) for f(x, 9) into 
y = f(x, 9) + e 
gives 
y = f(x, 9*) + Z(9*){e - 9*) + e 
or 
y(**) = Z(,9*) + e 
whereto 
y(f) = y - f(x, 9) + Z(9) 
(A.8) 
(A.9) 
(A.IO) 
(A.ll) 
^®By the assumptions, mean of y is determined by 9, or, in other words, the 
random variable y depends on the unknown parameter vector. So we may write y(g) 
instead of y. 
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Malinvaud (1980) calls (A. 10) as the linear pseudomodel. Since 9* is unknown, of 
course, the linear pseudomodel can not be directly used for parameter estimation. 
However, suppose that we knew Z(d*) and y(8*), then the linear LS estimator for 6* in 
(A.IO) is 
^LS = [z(e*yz{6*)f^z{e*)y(e*) (A. 12) 
with variance-covariance matrix 
Mls  = 0*^[z{e*yz{9*)]~^ (a . i3)  
Since the model is only approximately correct, (A. 13) holds only approximately. But 
if is sufficiently close to 6*, we can use 
"lS • (A M) 
The nonlinear estimators which are minimize the sum of square errors, (A.3) or (A.4), 
are consistent and asymptotically efficient estimators and asymptotically and normally 
distributed. In this study, proof for these properties of the estimates is omitted (for 
the proof, see Malinvuad, 1980, pp. 347-355). 
B. Computing Estimates: Gauss-Newton Algorithm 
To compute the LS estimates, it is necessary to minimize the sum of square 
errors, (A.3). However, for the nonlinear model, there may be multiple solutions not 
all of which correspond to the global minimum of the sum of squares function. In 
general, nonlinear estimation problems are solved by iterative techniques until this 
iterative process converges to the global minimum. So with different starting point 
and iterative process, it is possible to obtain global minimum of sum of squares 
function. 
Discussed linear pseudomodel is one possible way to find the roots of the 
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nonlinear normal equations, (A.5). In general, such a linear approximation to the 
nonlinear model will only be good close to the point where the derivative is evaluated. 
Since we do not know the true parameter vector, 6*, and hence can not approximate 
the nonlinear model by a linear model close to 6*, we use other vector, say, ôj, as a 
starting point. Substituting this into (A.9), we obtain as linear pseudomodel 
y(ôj) = Z(Op + e (A. 15) 
The algorithm for deriving global minimum of the sum of square errors, (A.3) or (A.4), 
by the least square estimation method proceeds as follows (Gallant, 1975): 
First, choose a starting estimate 9^, compute Dj = [z(ôj)'z(9j)]"'z(9j)'y(ôj) and 
find a r^ between 0 and 1 such that SSE(^j + ^jDj) ^ SSE(g^) 
Second, let 9^ = 6^ + TJDJ , compute and find a r^ 
between 0 and 1 such that SSE(g^ + r^D^) <_ 882(^2) 
Third, let ^3 = ^2 
There are several methods for choosing the step length r. at each iteration (see 
Hartley, 1961 and Gallant and Fuller, 1973). One way is to choose r. in i-th 
iteration to be the largest number in the sequence r^ = (0.8)®, s = 0, 1, ..., for 
which 
SSE(g. + r.D.) ^ SSE(e.) (A. 16) 
It is imperative that the computer program verify (A. 16) before taking next iterative 
step. The iterations are continued until terminated by a stopping rule such as 
W - *i+i : < h( H 4; II + d) (A.I7) 
and simultaneously 
I SSE(Ô.) - SSE(5.^j) 1 < h[SSE((?.) + d] (A. 18) 
where h > 0 and d > 0 are preset tolerances. Reasonable values are h = 10"^ and d = 
10 ^ (Marquardt, 1963). 
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If the model is truly nonlinear, successful convergence and the rate of 
convergence may depend heavily on the choice of starting values for the estimates. 
Choosing starting values, 6^ for the Gauss-Newton algorithm is an arbitrary process. 
As a normal practice, they may be obtained from prior knowledge of the situation, 
inspection of the data, grid search, or trial and errors. Hartley and Booker (1965) 
developed a general approach to finding the starting values. However, unfortunately 
no computer routines are available for the general approach of Hartley and Booker. 
Therefore, in practice, the algorithm is started at a few different points in the 
parameter space, which is reasonable if there is a rough idea of where the global 
minimum of SSE is located. In this study, we use Taylor's estimates of the 
parameters for Taylor model as starting values. 
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IX. APPENDIX B: SEEMINGLY UNRELATED REGRESSION (SUR) 
In the case of the true variance-covariance matrix, M, is unknown, we can not 
use However, we can utilize the estimated generalized least squares (EGLS) 
estimator by modifying (A. 12) as 
Ô Ls = [2(0*)-^^ X l )Z{d*)] '  ^  Z(6*)(^g X I)y(6*) (B. 1 ) 
where x represent the Kronecker product and the estimator is based on LS 
residuals 
e. = y.(gf) - Z.(gf)0. (B.3) 
and has elements given by 
cTjj = T"'e.'ej, i, j = 1, 2, ..., p (B.3) 
The estimator defined by (B.l) and (B.3) is frequently referred as Zellner's SUR 
estimator. 
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